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INTRODUCTION
"The United States is at war against al Qaeda, an international terrorist or-
ganization."' Over the past decade, the United States has invested substantial re-
sources fighting the "War on Terror." Terrorism prosecutions in Article III
courts have factored prominently in America's unconventional war with al
Qaeda and its affiliated extremist networks.3 In this rather unprecedented way,
the executive branch has enlisted the third branch-the judiciary-to pursue its
war aims.
Yet several aspects of this novel interbranch war strategy remain underdevel-
oped, including the system for punishing these terrorist defendants in Article III
courts. Indeed, amid the now-robust debates surrounding pretrial detention, the
procedural rights afforded at trial, and access to post-conviction remedies, there
has been relatively little conversation about the civilian courts' approach to sen-
tencing defendants convicted of crimes connected to the War on Terror. Nor has
there been much discussion as to how the executive's war objectives should factor
into the civilian sentencing analysis. Rather, the United States Sentencing Guide-
lines (USSG) have been routinely applied as adequate to guide the courts' sen-
tencing practices.
1. Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
2. The use of the term "War on Terror" is not without some controversy and aversion
in the Obama Administration. The balance of this Article uses the term loosely and
sometimes interchangeably with "the armed conflict with al Qaeda." Although the
"War on Terror" can be said to encompass a broader range of extremist groups and
movements, the al Qaeda organization was the progenitor of that larger conglom-
erate of "Islamic extremist groups and actors who share anti-Western motivations
and employ terrorism as their primary means." Kevin E. Lunday & Harvey Rishikof,
Due Process Is a Strategic Choice: Legitimacy and the Establishment of an Article III
National Security Court, 39 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 87, 88-89, n.4 (2008). The al Qaeda
organization's "declared goal is the establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate
throughout the Muslim world." Al-Qa'ida, NAT'L COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER,
http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al-qaida.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2013).
3. " [D]uring the first two years of Barack Obama's presidency, the annual number of
prosecutions for jihadist- related terrorism doubled." CTR. ON LAW & SEC., N.Y.U.
ScH. OF LAW, TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001-SEPTEMBER 11,
2011, at 2 (2011) [hereinafter TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD].
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This Article challenges that complacency. It argues that the USSG sentencing
regime is not properly suited to address crimes of coordinated, international ter-
rorism, which implicate national security, foreign policy, and geopolitics, and
which are connected to the broader conflict with al Qaeda. To advance that ar-
gument within the larger debate on terrorism prosecutions in civilian courts, this
Article aims to spark a principled dialogue about sentencing and punishment in
cases of international terrorism.4
To that end, Part I places the problem in context by reviewing the United
States' history of trying and punishing similar crimes in analogous circum-
stances. This review highlights the ways in which the current conflict, and the
interbranch strategy used to advance it, is unique to the United States' experience
with the law of war and punishment. Against the historical backdrop, Part II ar-
gues that the Sentencing Guidelines that currently apply to War on Terror cases
have developed without the proper perspective, as they do not consider relevant
law-of-war (and other military justice) principles and sentencing purposes. As a
result, the current guidelines sentencing system does not address the policy exi-
gencies of this conflict.
Part II urges U.S. policymakers to develop a new body of criminal sentencing
law that would apply in the armed-conflict context. That sentencing law would
require, as a starting point, a reoriented normative foundation, which incorpo-
rates the core law-of-war principles of proportionality and necessity, and military
justice principles of aggravation and mitigation, as well as the sentencing goals of
deterrence and incapacitation. Borrowing in this way from the military law en-
forcement model and international laws of war is defensible on the understand-
ing that criminal sentencing in an ongoing conflict serves conflict-related aims.
After discussing those purposes and principles, Part II draws out examples from
the case law to illustrate the main problem with the current guidelines system: its
inability to distinguish among terrorist offenders.
Part III elaborates on the need for distinction among offenders. It discusses
how the executive branch strategy of preventative prosecution has led to the pros-
ecution of a broad range of terrorist offense conduct, which, in turn, demands
the new sentencing framework proposed. To suit that strategy, Part III proposes
4. As several authors point out, "although the growing body of literature on terrorism
investigates patterns of global terrorism, terrorist networks, media coverage, and
societal responses to terrorism, relatively less attention has centered on correlates
of punishment of convicted terrorists." Mindy S. Bradley-Engen et al., Punishing
Terrorists: A Re-Examination of U.S. Federal Sentencing in the Postguidelines Era, 19
INT'L CRIM. JUST. REV. 433, 433-34 (2009). Though James McLoughlin undertakes
a thorough analysis of the sentencing aspects of terrorism prosecutions, and argues
that the sentencing guidelines, as applied, are flawed, his argument stops short of a
proposed alternative. This Article uses his work as a useful launchpad to suggest a
solution to some of the problems that McLoughlin identifies. See James P.
McLoughlin, Jr., Deconstructing United States Sentencing Guidelines Section 3A1.4:
Sentencing Failure in Cases of Financial Support for Foreign Terrorist Organizations,
28 LAW & INEQ. 51 (2010).
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revisions to the Sentencing Guidelines, which include a more fact-intensive anal-
ysis that considers the defendant's substantial steps, degree of participation, role
in the offense, and ideology. Part III explains that such a revision to the guidelines
regime not only better justifies the government's use of force to punish in this
conflict, but also advances national security policy by reducing the risk of terror-
ists' recidivism and bolstering support for the War on Terror domestically and
abroad.
I. THE UNITED STATES' HISTORY AND EXPERIENCE WITH PUNISHING
"TERRORISTS"
The United States has a rich history of developing the laws of war and pun-
ishing violations as war crimes. It is committed to these laws and customs, and
they form an important part of American society's collective conscience of the
national experience with war.' Yet despite its importance, this history does not
provide a perfect blueprint for punishing violations of the laws of war in the cur-
rent conflict with al Qaeda.7 For one, the legal standards for punishing violations
of the laws of war have not developed in conjunction with the laws themselves.
And moreover, this conflict has taken the nation into unchartered territory, chal-
lenging policymakers and courts to understand how even to apply well-estab-
lished laws and customs of war to the present context.
Nevertheless, America's history with punishment in war prior to 9/11 remains
important.8 It "put[s] us face-to-face with past generations' efforts to manage
many of the same kinds of dilemmas" and "offers a sense of what we can reason-
ably expect."9 In short, America's history with the laws of war and punishment
provides the necessary moral, social, and legal anchor to any effort to reform the
law and policy of sentencing in the War on Terror.
With that in mind, Section L.A considers the key moments in U.S. and world
history that have contributed to the development of the United States' practice
5. See JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN'S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN His-
TORY (2012) (providing an extensive historical review of the development of the
American law of war and explaining how the United States' standards and code of
warfare served to inform the development of the international law of war more
broadly).
6. Id. at 8 ("Grappling with the American history of the laws of war is therefore indis-
pensable if we are to make sense of the law and morality of military force in the
twenty-first century.").
7. See id. at 373 ("Sharp breaks between past and present limit history's usefulness as
a guide.... [I]t won't tell us whom we should prosecute in military commissions,
or for what crimes.").
8. See id. at 8-9 (noting that this history is key to reconciling two "competing ideals
for armed conflict"-"humanitarianism" and "justice").
9. Id. at 373.
312
31 : 309 201 3
PUNISHING CRIMES OF TERROR IN ARTICLE III COURTS
ofwartime punishment. That Section extracts certain bedrock principles for pun-
ishing in war, but it also highlights what questions of sentencing are left unan-
swered by historical experience. Section IJ.B turns to the current conflict and
considers the trial and punishment procedures used so far in the War on Terror.
It argues that, in view of the history discussed, the current approach, which prin-
cipally embraces the civilian system and an interbranch war strategy, has swung
too far, forgetting important lessons from American military history and the na-
tion's traditional commitment to the laws and customs of war and punishment.
A. The Pre-9/11 History and Experience
Though the term "terrorism" took on new meaning after 9/11, criminal acts
of terrorism are not new. Rather, conduct that society today labels as "terrorism"
has historically been known as sabotage, treason, or war crimes (that is, acts of
unlawful combat in war or armed conflict). 0 Generally speaking, unlawful acts
perpetrated during wartime and in pursuit of war aims were considered viola-
tions of the laws of war, and were tried and punished by the executive branch in
military (or multilateral) tribunals." And, because those crimes were inextricable
from the conflicts in which they were committed, the fora for trying them were
usually constituted specifically for that purpose; in other words, they were ad hoc.
Consequently, the punishments imposed by those tribunals were also specific to
the conflict" and consistent with contemporaneous military objectives? This
10. Terrorism has been defined as "any organized set of acts of violence designed to
create an atmosphere of despair or fear, to shake the faith of ordinary citizens in
their government and its representatives, [or] to destroy the structure of authority
which normally stands for security...." Burton M. Leiser, Terrorism, Guerilla War-
fare, and International Morality, 12 STAN. J. INT L STUD. 39, 39 (1977). " [Terrorism]
is a policy of seemingly senseless, irrational, and arbitrary murder, assassination,
sabotage, subversion, robbery, and other forms of violence . . . ." Id.
11. See Nora V. Demleitner, How Many Terrorists Are There? The Escalation in So-
Called Terrorism Prosecutions, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 38, 38 (2003) ("Terrorism pros-
ecutions are not novel in the U.S. criminal justice system. For many decades, how-
ever, they were not labeled terrorism cases but instead were classified as treason and
sabotage, as murders and bombings."); see also Kristen E. Eichensehr, Treason in
the Age of Terrorism: An Explanation and Evaluation of Treason's Return in Demo-
cratic States, 42 VAND. J. INT'L L. 1443 (2009) (discussing the history of treason laws
in the Anglo-Saxon tradition and reviewing treason prosecutions in the United
States in the post-World War II era).
12. See Brief for the Government at 21, Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (No. 11-1257), 2012 WL 136259, at *21 [hereinafter Hamdan, Br. for the
Gov't] ("Military commissions have been part of our legal architecture since the
Revolutionary War, and they are tailored to the realities of armed conflict.").
13. For a comprehensive history of the U.S. use of military tribunals and commissions,
see Michal R. Belknap, A Putrid Pedigree: The Bush Administration's Military Tri-
bunals in Historical Perspective, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 433 (2002).
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Section traces the development of these tribunals and the legal principles that
evolved around them.
1. The Development of American Values and Procedures for Punish-
ing Unlawful Acts in Wartime
From its inception, the United States has demonstrated a commitment to
and interest in developing the principles of lawful, civilized war. As one legal his-
torian notes, "No nation in the history of the world has made the law governing
the conduct of armies in war more crucial to its founding self-image than the
United States."14 Indeed, violations of the "rules of civilized warfare" were central
to America's Revolutionary claims; charges of King George III's "Plunder[ing]
our Seas," "ravag[ing] our Coasts, burn[ing] our Towns, and destroy[ing] the
Lives of our People" were levied in Congress's brief for independence.' The
Founders' hope for an "Enlightened" and "humane" "way of war" influenced the
methods and purposes of military trial by commission in the years following the
Revolution.'"
After independence, the U.S. military began trying and punishing foreign
nationals (including civilians) for war-related crimes as early as the Mexican-
American War. The Mexican use of guerilla tactics in 1847 resulted in what the
United States believed to be inhumane violations of the laws and customs of war.
General Winfield Scott sought to redress these violations by ordering martial law,
which provided that certain crimes against American soldiers committed by
Mexican civilians could be punished by military commissions.' Civilian criminal
courts were replaced by military commissions in occupied and hostile territory.
General Scott's martial law also authorized another form of military tribunal-
called "councils of war"-to punish violations of the "laws of war" committed by
Mexican guerilla fighters.'9 The councils of war were to "punish any flagrant vi-
olation of the laws of war by death or lashes, so long as there was satisfactory
proof that such prisoner, at the time of capture, actually belonged to any part of
a gang of known robbers or murderers." 0 These commissions proved formative
14. WITT, supra note 5, at 15.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 19, 23.
17. Belknap, supra note 13, at 448. By Scott's General Order No. 20, military commis-
sions were empowered to try "atrocities," including "assassination and murder,
malicious stabbing or maiming and rape, malicious assault, battery, robbery, theft,
the wanton desecration of churches, and the destruction of public or private prop-
erty." WIT, supra note 5, at 123-24. The order provided for jurisdiction over any
Mexican "inhabitant," a term of art which was understood to include civilians. Id.
18. Belknap, supra note 13, at 448.
19. Id.
20. WITT, supra note 5, at 126.
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to the burgeoning "national mythology of chivalry" in war, as they represented
an American stand against inhumane conduct in war (by Americans and Mexi-
cans alike) and sought to bring order to conflict."' And, with the tribunal's novel
seizure of jurisdiction over these offenses and defendants, they marked the first
time in history that the law blended "the idiom of war" and the "language of
crime."2
Military commissions were used extensively for similar purposes during the
Civil War.2 3 These tribunals were considered the best option for dealing with un-
conventional combatants, such as "bands of guerillas, not regularly enlisted in
the Confederate army," who committed ordinary crimes for political reasons,
such as "attack[ing] Union military forces, bases of supply, railroads, and civilian
targets of opportunity."' 4 Those irregular fighters, like al Qaeda terrorists today,
were "not perceived as legitimate combatants entitled to the privileges of bellig-
erents but, instead, as outlaws, marauders, and spies."' 5 These were the "most
common defendants" tried before the Civil War military commissions, consti-
tuting nearly eighty-five percent of people charged with violating the law of war
before the tribunals. 6 The expansion of the laws regulating warfare and, with
them, the ability to punish by military commission violators of those laws (soldier
and civilian), was an important part of the North's "strategy for winning the
war."27 Reliance on trial and punishment thus served "not only as a restraint,"
but also as an instrument of "power of a nation at war. "" In this way, punishment
in wartime became both a source for maintaining principled order in a conflict
and a means of advancing an effective war strategy.
21. Id. at 123-24, 127.
22. Id. at 125, 127- 28.
23. See id. at 267 ("Nearly 1,ooo individuals were charged with violating the laws of war
during the course of the [Civil War].").
24. Hamdan, Br. for the Gov't, supra note 12, at 30; see also Belknap, supra note 13, at
449 (noting that the Civil War military commissions tried mainly guerilla activities
such as horse stealing and bridge burning).
25. Hamdan, Br. for the Gov't, supra note 12, at 54.
26. WITT, supra note 5, at 268.
27. Id. at 274.
28. Id. In the wake of the Civil War, military commissions also tried violations of the
"common law of war" or the "laws and customs of war." Id. at 294, 298. Notable
among these trials were the Lincoln conspiracy trials, in which the eight civilians
accused of conspiring with John Wilkes Booth to assassinate President Lincoln on
April 14, 1865 were found guilty and sentenced to death, and the trial of Captain
Henry Wirz, who committed atrocities at the prisoner-of-war camp in Anderson-
ville, Georgia. See id. at 294-99; Belknap, supra note 13, at 449, 462, 467 & n.253, 469.
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The next major phase in the development of the laws of war and punishment
came during and in the wake of the Second World War.9' By this point, the in-
ternational perspective had been primed by the American experience. The laws
of war codified by Francis Lieber and approved by President Lincoln during the
Civil War served as the foundation for European thinking on the conduct of war
around the time of the first Geneva Convention in 1864.30 Lieber's new term "war
crime" captured for the first time an "idea that had been implicit in the American
experience from the Mexican War forward."31 And so, following the American
example, a formalized, international consensus on what constitutes a "war
crime" developed shortly after the world wars, with the drafting and ratification
of the Geneva Conventions and the constitution of the Nuremburg tribunals.3 '
The Geneva Conventions codified the law of armed conflict (LOAC) as a
conventional body of international law to govern in cases of armed conflict.3 3
29. Military commissions were used during the Indian Wars in the American West in
the post-Civil War period but, considering that these trials "threw American views
of the laws of armed conflict into a vast confusion," their use is more anomalous
than indicative of America's path in developing the principles of lawful warfare and
punishment. WITT, supra note 5, at 330. President Wilson did not use military com-
missions to try war crimes committed in the United States during World War I.
JENNIFER ELSEA, TERRORISM AND THE LAW OF WAR: TRYING TERRORISTS AS WAR
CRIMINALS 22 (2001).
30. WITT, supra note 5, at 342-43.
31. Id. at 343.
32. See KEVIN JON HELLER, THE NUREMBURG MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE ORIGINS
OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3 (2011) (providing a comprehensive review of
the Nuremburg Military Tribunal proceedings).
33. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114,
75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter
Geneva II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva
III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
Geneva IV]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Con-
ventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-Inter-
national Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. The United States has not
ratified Additional Protocol I or II. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 16-17 (Andrew
Gillman & William Johnson eds., 2012) (publication of the Judge Advocate Generals
Legal Center & School, U.S. Army); Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International
Humanitarian Law: Challenges from the "War on Terror," 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD
AFF. 55, 60 (2003).
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Common Article 334 became the basis for international humanitarian law and is
now understood to apply in most cases where the LOAC applies.35 But it was the
legal proceedings at Nuremburg that truly "gave birth... to crimes against peace,
crimes against humanity, and the crime of criminal membership."36 The first in-
stallment of Nuremburg trials was held by what was known as the International
Military Tribunal (IMT).37 After the IMT concluded, the United States conducted
subsequent proceedings in the Nuremburg Military Tribunals (NMT), in which
the United States tried 177 members of the Third Reich."8 Unlike the IMT, the
NMT was not an international tribunal, but rather was authorized by executive
order.3 9
It seems to have been implicit at Nuremburg that terrorism-like offenses
were considered, at that time, to violate the LOAC as war crimes. At the conclu-
sion of World War I, the Allies condemned Germany for "violat[ing] the laws
and customs of war," including "the execution of a system of terrorism" that in
volved "[m]urders and massacres [of non-combatants] ... [and] the arbitrary
destruction of public and private property." 40 More definitively, after the Second
World War, the Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Army included "[slystematic
terrorism" and "[w]anton destruction of property" in a published list of war
crimes subject to trial by military commission under the "laws and customs of
war." 41 Ultimately, the NMT trials resulted in 142 convictions. Twenty-four of
34. It is common to each of the four Geneva Conventions. See John T. Rascliffe,
Changes to the Department of Defense Law of War Program, ARMY L., Aug. 2006, at
23, 25.
35. As Rona explains, "[t]he terms 'international humanitarian law,' 'humanitarian
law,' 'law of armed conflict,' 'jus in bello' and 'laws of war' are interchangeable."
Rona, supra note 33, at 55 n.1; see also Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, What Is
the Role of International Human Rights Law in the War on Terror?, 5o DEPAUL L.
REV. 803, 803 (2010) (explaining the relevance of human rights law, which was "de-
signed to operate primarily in normal peacetime conditions," to the LOAC).
36. HELLER, supra note 32, at 3.
37. Id. at 1-2.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 112-13; see United States Executive Directive, JCS 1023/10 (July 8, 1945). Pro-
fessor Heller characterizes these tribunals as "inter-allied special tribunals created
pursuant to Law No. i0, a multilateral agreement enacted by the Allied Control
Council as the supreme legislative authority in Germany." HELLER, supra note 32,
at 113.
40. Hamdan, Br. for the Gov't, supra note 12, at 51 (quoting COMM'N OF RESPONSIBIL-
ITIES, CONFERENCE OF PARIS 1919, VIOLATION OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR
16 -17 (1919)).
41. Id. (quoting FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, DIPLOMATIC PAPERS
1944, H.R. Doc. No. 79-303, pt. 1, vol. 1, at 1267, 1272-73 (1945)).
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those convicted were sentenced to death, twenty to life imprisonment, and
ninety-seven to imprisonment for a term of years.4'
Perhaps because these tribunals were conceived out of an urgency to punish
violations of the laws of war, their focus was on the trials of those violations them-
selves, rather than on the legal standards-if any-that governed the parameters
of the punishments imposed. Indeed, the World War II tribunals "left few sen-
tencing guidelines" for future war crimes tribunals and commissions to follow.43
At most, "[t]he tribunals occasionally appended a perfunctory final paragraph to
their judgments reviewing 'mitigating factors' in the rare cases where these were
deemed to be present." 44 The Nuremburg tribunal in particular "never explained
how [it] determined the sentences [it] imposed-even when the sentence was
death," nor did it "comment on the general sentencing principles [it] applied."45
The domestic counterparts to the NMT did not fill this gap in guidance.
Among the notable trials, the United States famously tried several Nazi saboteurs
in 1942 for, among other offenses, "relieving or attempting to relieve . . . the en-
emy" in violation of the applicable laws of war, and conspiracy to commit those
offenses. 46 In those cases, the saboteurs had come from Germany to complete
their respective sabotage missions, landing in two groups, one in Florida and one
in Long Island. Upon arrival, the saboteurs discarded their military uniforms and
embarked on their mission. Due to a series of snafus, their plots were ultimately
thwarted by the FBI. Attorney General Francis Biddle advised President Roose-
velt to try the saboteurs by military commission, on the view that, " [u]nder the
internationally accepted 'law of war,' apart from our Constitution, enemy aliens
42. HELLER, supra note 32, at 313. For those sentenced to a term of years, the sentences
ranged from two-and-a-half to ten years. Id. at 329.
43. William A. Schabas, Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human Rights Ap-
proach, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INTL L. 461, 461 (1997).
44. Id.
45. HELLER, supra note 32, at 313-14. Of course, in addition to the Nuremburg trials, it
was not uncommon for the U.S. military to try and punish soldiers in the Axis army
for crimes committed during hostilities. As detailed in the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), Japanese General Yamashita was con-
victed by a military commission convened by the commanding general of the U.S.
armed forces in the Western Pacific for crimes committed by his troops in the final
stages of World War II. Similarly, in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), Ger-
man soldiers were convicted by a military commission for continuing to engage in
hostilities against U.S. forces in China after Germany had surrendered to the Allies.
Notably, the Supreme Court held that "[t]he jurisdiction of military authorities,
during or following hostilities, to punish those guilty of offenses against the laws of
war is long- established." Id. at 786. The Court also confirmed that it was well estab-
lished that the military has jurisdiction over "enemy belligerents, prisoners of war,
or others charged with violating the laws of war." Id.; Belknap, supra note 13, at 443-
44.
46. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 23 (1942).
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of domestic citizens who came through the lines out of uniform for the purpose
of engaging in hostile acts ... are subject to trial by military tribunals."47
The President ultimately agreed.48 Apparently, the decision to use a military
rather than a civilian court was in part motivated by a sentencing consideration:
a trial by military commission rendered the defendants eligible for the death pen-
alty, whereas the maximum penalty in civilian court for attempted sabotage
would have been thirty years in prison. 49 The defendants were found guilty and
sentenced to death."o The penal outcome desired-death-drove the choice of
forum. For this, Ex Parte Quirin did not leave much of a sentencing- analysis leg-
acy.
By the late twentieth century, it had become well established that war crimes
included certain acts of "terrorism" and that those crimes could be punished mil-
itarily. Equally well established were the legal standards governing the use of force
in conflict. Yet few standards had developed at the intersection: no rules of law
were defined to govern the punishments imposed on war criminals or those who
perpetrated criminal acts of terror. There was no occasion for the United States
to develop such rules after the post-World War II era, as there were no major
instances of trial by military commission in the context of war after that period.
Although the United States engaged in other armed conflicts-in Korea, Vi-
etnam, and the Gulf, for instance-those conflicts did not create a significant
need to try and punish civilians or foreign nationals for crimes of war, sabotage,
treason and the like, committed by civilians during wartime."
2. The International and Comparative Approach in the Post-World
War II Era
In the postwar period, the international community assumed the mantle of
prosecuting war crimes. After Nuremburg, with the creation of the United Na-
tions, the international community continued to pursue, prosecute, and punish
war crimes and violations of international humanitarian law, in cases where the
47. Memorandum from Oscar Cox to Francis Biddle, Att'y Gen. (June 29, 1942), Box
61, Oscar Cox Papers, Roosevelt Library.
48. Belknap, supra note 13, at 472; David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs' Case, 1 J. Sup. CT.
HisT. Soc'Y 61, 63-64 (1996).
49. Belknap, supra note 13, at 471; see Michael R. Belknap, The Supreme Court Goes to
War: The Meaning and Implications of the Nazi Saboteur Case, 89 MIL. L. REV. 59,
63 (1980).
50. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 44-45.
51. Violations of the laws of war by U.S. servicemen were tried by the ordinary courts-
martial process. During the Vietnam War, for example, 201 army personnel and 77
marines were tried by general and special courts-martial for crimes against Viet-
namese civilians. ROBERT DOYLE, THE ENEMY IN OUR HANDS: AMERICA'S TREAT-
MENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE WAR ON TERROR 287
(2010).
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relevant nation-state was unable to do so. Pursuant to Article 29 of its charter,
the UN has the power to constitute special tribunals that function as "subsidiary
organs" for this purpose." It has done so on several occasions.
The first of these special tribunals after Nuremberg was the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).53 The ICTY was established
in 1993 to try and punish the war crimes committed in the conflicts in the Balkans
during the 1990s.54 Similarly, in 1994, the Security Council created the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to prosecute violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law committed in Rwanda in 1994.55 Unlike the directive
governing the NMT (or, for that matter, the treaty provisions under which the
IMT was constituted), the statutes creating the ICTY and ICTR have "brief pro-
visions dealing with sentencing, proposing that sentences be limited to impris-
onment." 6' The statutes also direct the tribunals to consider "the 'general prac-
tice'. . . of the criminal courts in the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda,"" as well as
international human rights law (IHRL).5' These tribunals' sentencing practices at
a minimum introduced the laws of war (or at least human rights law) to war-
related sentencing and punishment analyses. 9
From a comparative standpoint, England also provided an interesting exam-
ple as a more general precedent for adapting national court systems to the context
of terrorism. England's "Diplock" court system, as it is known,0 emerged from
52. Schabas, supra note 43, at 465; see U.N. Charter art. 29.
53. About the ICTY, UN ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY (last vis-
ited July 14, 2012).
54. The ad hoc tribunal is projected to be completed by 2016, inclusive of any appeal
proceedings. Id.
55. About the ICTR, UN ICTR, http://www.unictr.org/AboutICTR/Generallnform
ation/tabid/ioi/Default.aspx (last visited July 14, 2012).
56. Schabas, supra note 43, at 461-62.
57. Id. at 468.
58. This includes provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(IJI) (Dec. io, 1948), and the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. Id. at 467.
59. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 35 (explaining the relevance of human rights law
to the laws of war).
6o. The system was born of recommendations of a commission led by Lord Diplock,
hence the "Diplock courts." REPORT OF THE COMMISSION To CONSIDER LEGAL
PROCEDURES To DEAL WITH TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1972),
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/diplock.htm; see The Justice and Security (Northern Ire-
land) Act 2007 (Commencement No.1 and Transitional Provisions) Order 2007,
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2007/2o45/contents/made (last visited Apr. 8,
2013). For further discussion of the Diplock system, see JOHN JACKSON & SEAN
DORAN, JUDGE WITHOUT JURY: DIPLOCK TRIALS IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
(1995).
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its conflict with the Irish Republican Army and the Troubles in Northern Ireland.
It was designed to punish "ordinary" crimes-bombings, murders, and kidnap-
pings-committed by civilians and against civilians, which are politically moti-
vated and connected to a broader, protracted conflict." The system began in the
mid-1970s,6 with the 1973 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, and
modified the typical civilian tribunal to allow for nonjury trials for "offenses con-
nected with political agitation."63 That decision was apparently motivated by na-
tional security concerns.4 While initially intended as a temporary measure,5 the
Diplock courts continue to exist today and have been used in post-9/11 terrorism
cases.66 The Diplock courts are useful to bear in mind, as they tend to suggest
that, where civilian courts are employed to advance conflict-related objectives,
procedural modifications to that legal system are likely to be necessary.0 7
The next Section considers how the United States has, so far, adapted its own
civilian legal systems to punish crimes of terrorism, after some initial experimen-
tation with the use of a military framework.
61. See generally LAURA K. DONOHUE, COUNTER-TERRORIST LAW AND EMERGENCY
POWERS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1922-2000 (2001) (reviewing related counter-
terrorism legislation).
62. Laura K. Donohue, Terrorism and Trial by Jury: The Vices and Virtues of British and
American Criminal Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1321, 1326 (2007).
63. Niamh Howlin, "The Terror of Their Lives": Irish Jurors' Experiences, 29 LAW & HIST.
REV. 703, 761 (2011).
64. Matthew S. Podell, Removing Blinders from the Judiciary, 23 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 263, 267-68 (2000) (noting the jury system was thought to be "unworkable in
the context of political violence in Northern Ireland, where there existed a real
threat of witness and juror intimidation by terrorist groups"). In these courts, one
judge presides and provides the defendant with a written verdict. DONOHUE, supra
note 61, at 1334; see Diplock Courts, BBC NEWS (July 3, 2007),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/law-in-action/6265734.stm.
65. Donohue, supra note 62, at 1326.
66. See, e.g., Al-Qaeda Terror Suspect Is Jailed, BBC NEWS (Dec. 20, 2005),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/northern-ireland/4545692.stm; see also FER-
GAL FRANCIS DAVIS, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SPECIAL CRIMINAL
COURT, 1922-2005 (2007) (discussing the legal history of Ireland's special criminal
court system with a focus on the legitimacy effects of a nonjury system).
67. In terms of sentencing specifically, the English model does not add much. Indeed,
the commentary on the Diplock courts does not suggest that those courts have de-
veloped a creative, or particularly nuanced, approach to punishing terrorists. More-
over, although the literature on the Diplock system is extensive, there is very little
discussion of its sentencing practices or principles. At most, there is some sugges-
tion that defendants convicted by these courts are sentenced as "ordinary crimi-
nals" who have committed analogous offenses outside the political/wartime con-
text. See JOHN E. FINN, CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE
RULE OF LAW 122 (1990) (considering, but rejecting, the likelihood of sectarian bias
in sentencing offenses committed by Republicans and Loyalists).
321
YALE LAW& POLICY REVIEW
B. The Post-9/11 Approach to Punishing in the War on Terror
By 9/11, the United States had some partial historical examples to consider in
devising a system for apprehending, detaining, and trying these new enemies of
the state. And it had a well-developed and internationally accepted legal code
governing the conduct of war to consult. What the United States lacked, however,
was a solid precedent for punishing war criminals in the novel type of armed
conflict that it faced.
With little guidance to draw upon, the task of designing a legal system for
treating crimes of terror was not easy. From the start, the War on Terror has cre-
ated a complicated legal landscape in which the courts and policymakers have
struggled to maneuver. There are several ways in which that landscape is confus-
ing. For one, for purposes of navigating the LOAC, the nature of the conflict de-
fies traditional definition-as it arguably is neither an interstate (i.e., interna-
tional) conflict nor an intrastate (i.e., civil) war." The "enemy" is also difficult to
define: though "al Qaeda" is loosely used as a synonym for the "enemy" in the
War on Terror (and throughout this Article), they are not always one and the
same. Although al Qaeda was the basis for the modern, anti-Western radical Is-
lamic movement in general, and the group with whom many other terrorist or-
ganizations affiliate and identify today, many other extremist groups operate in-
dependently and with varying, regional aims.9 While distinct from al Qaeda,
those groups are still considered "enemies" in the War on Terror.70
Moreover, the duration of the conflict is unprecedented. Unlike conflicts or
wars where the military objectives on both sides are concrete and therefore ame-
nable to success or failure, the current conflict with terror has the potential to last
68. See Rona, supra note 33, at 56-63 (discussing reasons why neither characterization
is an "elegant" fit to the War on Terror).
69. Lunday & Rishikof, supra note 2, at 134.
70. See id. (noting that these groups' "association with Al Qaeda has transformed it
from a terrorist group into a broader, loose network or conglomeration of Islamic
extremist groups and actors who share anti-Western motivations and employ ter-
rorism as their primary means"). There is some suggestion that the al Qaeda organ-
ization has been seriously weakened by U.S. counterterrorism efforts since 9/11 and
that it is "at the point of collapse." Daniel L. Byman, The History of Al Qaeda,
BROOKINGS (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/09
/oi-al-qaeda-history-byman. Regardless of whether that is true, the threat of terror-
ism from al Qaeda's affiliate terrorist networks and groups remains as strong as
ever: "In Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, and the Maghreb, strong affiliate organizations are
in rebellion against their governments. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, like-minded
groups are also up in arms. . . . [T]hese organizations vary in how much control
the al Qaeda core in Pakistan exerts over them, and how much their focus is global
rather than local. But they share at least some of al Qaeda's ideology and goals." Id.
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indefinitely" Finally, both domestic and international legal and ethical standards
have evolved considerably in the last several decades, suggesting that, as a society,
the United States no longer accepts the same standards that have governed the
government's conduct in past wars." As legal historian John Fabian Witt points
out, it would be "silly to deny the vast differences that separate the present day
from the age that witnessed the rise of the modern laws of war."7 Not only has
the nature of armed conflict changed over time, but so too has society's awareness
of conflict and the government's conduct in it, thanks in large part to the twenty-
four-hour news cycle and video technology.74 In this new social and legal land-
scape, both the executive and the judiciary have been challenged to (re)define the
crime of international terrorism in the context of the War on Terror, and also to
determine the most effective, moral, and fair way to punish it.
The unique nature of the conflict, unknown to this country's history with
war, thus understandably called for a new system of trial and punishment. The
next Subsection considers the evolution of the War on Terror legal systems since
9/11. First, it reviews the military track on which the War on Terror began. Sec-
ond, it explains the civilian, or law enforcement, track that has now become dom-
inant in the executive's war strategy. That system is still developing, with the legal
precepts for punishment, in particular, perhaps the slowest to evolve.
1. The Military Track: The Law-of-War Framework
Initially, the trial and punishment of the operatives in the War on Terror
seemed to fall squarely within the jurisdiction of the military branches. Military
jurisdiction arises from, among other sources, "that which is derived from inter-
national law, including the law of war."7 From the outset, the acts of terrorism
perpetrated by al Qaeda networks resembled those that historically violated the
international law of war. As the State Department has noted,
71. The State Department has said that the al Qaeda "threat will be sustained over a
protracted period (decades not years) and will require a global response executed
regionally, nationally, and locally." The Terrorist Enemy, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://200l-20o9.state.gov/s/ct/enemy/index.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2013).
72. See Schabas, supra note 43, at 464 ("[A] fter initial suggestions that it fell within the
reserved domain of sovereign states[,] . . . criminal law has become imbued with
legal principles derived from international human rights law that barely existed in
1945.").
73. WIT, supra note 5, at 372. He continues: "The sheer density of the relevant treaties,
for example, is an utter novelty of the past sixty years." Id.
74. Id.
75. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, ch. 1, § 1
(1956). In the Civil War era, the judge advocates understood the authority of mili-
tary commissions to derive from the common law of war. WITT, supra note 5, at
270.
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The al-Qaida network has many of the characteristics of a "globalized
insurgency" and employs subversion, sabotage, open warfare and, of
course, terrorism. It seeks weapons of mass destruction or other means
to inflict massive damage on the United States, our allies and interests,
and the broader international system. [Al-Qaida] aims to overthrow the
existing world order and replace it with a reactionary, authoritarian,
transnational entity.76
Consistent with that description, in the years immediately following 9/11, the
government deemed these operatives to be enemy combatants, subject to deten-
tion for the duration of hostilities pursuant to the LOAC, and tried them by mil-
itary commission"-"panel[s] of military officers convened by military authority
to try enemy belligerents on charges of a violation of the law of war."7
That system was born with President Bush's November 2001 order announc-
ing that military tribunals could be used to try noncitizens suspected of involve-
ment in the 9/11 attacks.79 As the operational complement to that order, Congress
passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), authorizing the
President "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, or-
ganizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 . . . in order to prevent
any future acts of international terrorism against the United States."so After the
Supreme Court held that the initial military commission system contravened the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)," Congress responded by enacting the
20o6 Military Commissions Act (MCA),8 concluding that terrorism as a method
of armed conflict was a "modern-day war crime[]" and, as such, a "practice[]
contrary to the law of nations.""3 Congress passed a revised MCA in 2009.14
Significantly, both the 20o6 and 2009 MCAs addressed the crime of support-
ing terrorism, which the previous statutory treatment of international war crimes
76. The Terrorist Enemy, supra note 71.
77. Robert M. Chesney, Terrorism, Criminal Prosecution, and the Preventive Detention
Debate, 50 S. TEx. L. REV. 669, 671 (2009).
78. ELSEA, supra note 29, at 17. Military commissions are distinct from a military court
martial, which tries service members for violations of military law. Id.
79. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
8o. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115
Stat. 224, 224 (2001) (codified at 5o U.S.C. § 1541 (2012)) (emphasis added).
81. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 5575 567 (2006).
82. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 26oo (2006).
83. H.R. REP. No. 109-664, Pt. i, at 25 (2006).
84. Pub. L. No. 111-84, tit. XVIII, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574 (2009) (codified at io U.S.C. § 47A
(2012)).
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did not include." In particular, section 950v(b)(25) of the 20o6 MCA made pun-
ishable the offense of providing material support or resources to those "who ...
ha[ve] engaged in hostilities ... or who ha[ve] purposefully and materially sup-
ported hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners."" It applies
to those who have provided "material support or resources to an international
terrorist organization engaged in hostilities against the United States."7 The 2006
MCA thus "clarified the scope of the Executive's authority to try war crimes,""
adding crimes that include conspiracy and material support for terrorism to the
"generic" international law of war.'
As such, the jurisdiction of the military commissions is not in serious doubt.
Military commissions have long been authorized to try war crimes committed by
the enemy, which, after 20o6, include materially supporting terrorism.9 0 And the
government has made clear that it views the conflict with al Qaeda and its syndi-
cates as an "armed conflict" that triggers some, though not all, provisions of the
LOAC.91 As two preeminent national security scholars have noted,
85. The preexisting statute that authorized war crimes military commissions referred
to violations of the "law of war" and cross referenced the international law of war
in particular. io U.S.C. § 821 (2012). The "generic" law of war, incorporated in sec-
tion 821, included spying and aiding and abetting the enemy. Id. §§ 821, 904, 906.
86. Id. § 948a(7).
87. Id. § 950t(25).
88. Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
89. Id.; see Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3, 120 Stat. 2600,
2630 (2006) (codified at io U.S.C. § 950t) (2012).
90. Hamdan, 696 F.3d at 1245.
91. As Corn and Jenson argue, there is some ambiguity over the extent to which the
LOAC applies to the conflict with al Qaeda, as it defies strict classification as inter-
national within the meaning of Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, or
noninternational within the traditional meaning of Common Article 3 of the Ge-
neva Conventions. "Because transnational armed conflicts are not, like their inter-
national counterparts, governed by the full corpus of the [LOAC,]" the extent to
which those rules apply in the conflict with al Qaeda remains something of an open
question. Geoffrey Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Transnational Armed Conflict: A
"Principled" Approach to the Regulation of Counter-Terror Combat Operations, 42
ISR. L. REV. 46, 58 (2009). Some urge that ordinary law enforcement rules (i.e.,
criminal law) apply rather than the laws of war. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, War and
Enemy Status After 9/11: Attacks on the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 325 (2003);
Rona, supra note 33; Kenneth Roth, The Law of War in the War on Terror, in THE
U.S. VS. AL QAEDA 133 (Gideon Rose & Jonathan Tepperman eds., 2011).
The applicability and scope of the corpus of the LOAC to the War on Terror
is complex, and well beyond the scope of this Article. It is clear, however, that the
government has operated, and continues to operate, on the view that the War on
Terror is an armed conflict, and that the al Qaeda terrorist fighters are not lawful
combatants and therefore not entitled to the protections of the Third or Fourth
Geneva Conventions, which extend certain rights to prisoners of war and civilians
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The assumption that the "war on terror," so understood, is such a con-
flict-and is not, or not only, a matter of domestic law enforcement-
has been recognized by Congress, the U.S. Supreme Court, the UN Se-
curity Council, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Other courts reviewing the legality of military actions in situations of
terror that are similar to the United States' conflict with al Qaeda have
also concluded that the LOAC-as distinct from domestic criminal
law-provides the appropriate rules of decision.92
This view is not unique to conservative scholars and the Bush Administration.93
As one author notes, "It did not take long for the Obama administration to
demonstrate that it was not about to abandon an armed conflict-based approach
to dealing with the al Qaeda threat."94 In particular, the United States continues
to use combat power against al Qaeda operatives, including the use of deadly
force as a measure of first resort through targeted or drone killings, which is "an
unavoidable indicator that the United States continues to rely on an armed con-
flict-based legal framework."95
However, there have only been a handful of trials by military commission for
a material support offense under the UCMJ. The case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld is
during conflict. See Rona, supra note 33, at 66; Tung Yin, Ending the War on Ter-
rorism One Terrorist at a Time: A Noncriminal Detention Modelfor Holding and Re-
leasing Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 149, 154 (2005); John
Bellinger, Armed Conflict with al Qaida?, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 15, 2007), http://opin-
iojuris.org/2007/01/15/armed-conflict-with-al-qaida.
92. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 35, at 803-04.
93. "Military commissions trying enemy belligerents for war crimes apply directly the
international law of war, without recourse to domestic criminal statutes unless such
statutes are declaratory of international law." ELSEA, supra note 29, at 30 (emphasis
added); see U.S. ARMY JAG, LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK 20 (Keith E. Pulse ed., 2005)
("The sources of military jurisdiction include the Constitution and international
law. International law includes the law of war.").
In 2012, the D.C. Circuit was confronted with the question of whether material
support for terrorism was a preexisting international law war crime under io U.S.C.
§ 821. It held that it was not. Although the 2006 MCA explicitly defined material
support for terrorism as a war crime (after Hamdan's offense), it held that "the
Military Commissions Act [does] not . . . retroactively punish new crimes" and
therefore "Hamdan's conviction for material support for terrorism cannot stand."
Hamdan, 696 F.3d at 1241.
94. Geoffrey S. Corn, Self-Defense Targeting: Blurring the Line Between the Jus ad Bel-
lum and the Jus in Bello 57, 63 (SSRN Elec. Library, Working Paper No. 1,947,838,
2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1947838.
95. Id.; see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED
AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL- QA'IDA
OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE, http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news
/020413_DOJ_WhitePaper.pdf.
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perhaps the best known.9' Hamdan was, famously, Osama bin Laden's body-
guard and chauffeur. In November 2001, he was captured in Afghanistan while
driving a vehicle containing anti-aircraft missiles and other military equipment,
as well as al Qaeda documentation allowing him to have these weapons in Af-
ghanistan. 91 He was turned over to U.S. military forces and transferred to the
detention facility at GuantAnamo Bay. 8 Hamdan was convicted on five specifi-
cations in his charge,99 and sentenced to sixty-six months, which was reduced to
five-and-a-half months for time served.'00 His conviction was vacated in 2012.01
That relative inactivity is indicative of the military commissions' difficult his-
tory. Their detractors have been vocal. Less-if ever-discussed, however, are the
aspects of these tribunals that recommended them. Most notable among the
commissions' positive features is their sentencing system. The War on Terror
commissions follow the UCMJ rules for sentencing, which provide for jury de-
liberation and determination of the punishment.1 0 ' In cases like Hamdan, juries
sentence terrorist operatives by taking into account aggravating and mitigating
circumstances when proposing and then voting on the sentence. As compared to
federal court cases, that sentencing system has led to comparatively lenient sen-
tences.'03 Also, unlike past tribunals, which were always ad hoc, these military
commissions could have become institutionalized as part of a standing tribunal.
A standing tribunal could, in theory, incorporate the relevant laws of war in the
context of sentencing and develop a principled body of sentencing law in the
context of armed conflict. These features of the commissions created some po-
tential for the U.S. military to develop a law of punishment and sentencing spe-
cific to armed conflict, and to do so fairly and consistent with modern sensibili-
ties of war.
That potential was largely lost amid the general public disapproval of the
commissions and the knee-jerk movement to the civilian track. Probably because
of the public outcry, there was little effort to import any aspects of the military
model to the civilian one-including those that were, at face value, quite desira-
ble and fair. The civilian system now used, while coherent within the four corners
of Article III and the criminal code, is almost entirely divorced from the military
model and the history behind it.
96. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
97. See Hamdan, Br. for the Gov't, supra note 12, at 33-34 (citing to the record and var-
ious government exhibits).
98. Id. at 13.
99. Id. at 14.
1oo. Id.
io0. See Hamdan, 696 F.3d 1238.
102. See UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE R. lo(b)(4), iooi(c), ioo6.
103. Daphne Eviatar, Military Commissions Are a Terrorist's Best Bet, HUFFINGTON POST
(Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/human-rights-first/military
-commissions- are b_458315.html.
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2. Civilian Criminal Trials: The Law Enforcement Framework
At least initially, the civilian system was seen as an important complement
to-rather than a replacement for-the military system:
Criminal punishment and military detention serve some similar-but
not identical purposes, and one or the other might be called for depend-
ing on the circumstances of the particular subject. Some persons could
be appropriately dealt with under either system. There may well be per-
sons who cannot be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, yet who
the government can justify detaining as enemy combatants because they
fall within the terms of the Authorization to Use Military Force and they
have taken up arms against the United States. 10 4
However, as the conflict has worn on, the government has increasingly turned to
the nonmilitary-that is, law enforcement-track for pursuing its war aims by
prosecuting terrorist operatives in civilian courts.0 ' Indeed, the civilian system
has, essentially, wholly replaced the military system in the government's preven-
tative prosecution strategy.
Several reasons account for this shift. For one, as compared to their civilian
counterpart, "military commissions have been far less fruitful tribunals."0 6 The
commissions have convicted in only six cases since 9/11.107 The remaining cases
have been "stalled" or removed to the civilian courts.'o Perhaps most damning,
"major questions surrounding the military commissions are still unresolved, and
they will likely need to be addressed by the Supreme Court in order for the com-
missions to become a reliable and authoritative source of decision making alto-
gether."0 9 As one scholar notes, "despite all of the attention that has been paid
toward military commissions, the real adjudicative action vis-a-vis foreign ter-
rorists" is in the Article III courts.110
104. Tung Yin, Coercion and Terrorism Prosecutions in the Shadow of Military Detention,
2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1255, 1326; see also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 793
(1950) (Black, J., dissenting) (stating the basic principle of immunity from murder
charges resulting from legitimate warfare).
105. Some scholars go so far as to argue that the criminal law framework is, in fact, the
only appropriate legal framework applicable to cases of terrorism. See sources cited
supra note 91.
io6. Sara A. Solow, Prosecuting Terrorists as Criminals and the Limits of Extraterritorial




110. Id. at 1491 & n.24 (noting that, according to the Center on Law and Security at New
York University, from September ii, 2001 through September ii, 2010, the United
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Modern antiterrorism legislation 1 dates to the early 196os, with the enact-
ment of a statute implementing an international convention against air piracy.'
In the following decades, various international antiterrorism treaties, and their
domestic implementing legislation, responded to particular, isolated "political
events.""3 However, the government quickly realized it needed a different prose-
cutorial tool to advance the War on Terror that was geared toward prevention,
not reaction. As Attorney General Ashcroft explained to Congress immediately
after 9/11, "at the command of the President of the United States, I began to mo-
bilize the resources of the Department of Justice toward one single, overarching
and overriding objective: to save innocent lives from further acts of terrorism."11 4
In line with that goal, the Department of Justice henceforth aimed to "prevent
first, prosecute second."ns
To effectuate a preventative prosecutorial strategy, the government had to
resort to a particular statutory arsenal-the material support statutes, codified at
18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B. The purposes of these two statutes are to "prevent
persons within the United States, or subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States government brought 998 criminal indictments against persons for terrorism-
associated crimes).
ill. The U.S. Code defines a federal crime of terrorism as any action "to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population or to influence the conduct or policy of a government
through the use of coercion or mass destruction and other serious offenses." 8
U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2012). Title 18 has a chapter called terrorism, which includes
homicide and use of biological or nuclear weapons. 18 U.S.C. ch. 113B (2012). How-
ever, with respect to several of the statutes in this chapter, which are used to prose-
cute terrorism offenses, nothing in the statutory language ties the offense to terror-
ism per se. "In some cases it may, therefore, not be the elements of an offense but
rather the placement or heading of the statute that defines whether a crime is
deemed an act of terrorism." Demleitner, supra note 11, at 38. Also, it bears noting
that some executive agencies have promulgated their own definitions of "terror-
ism" as well. The FBI, for instance, defines terrorism as "the unlawful use of force
and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the
civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social ob-
jectives." Id.
112. Demleitner, supra note ll, at 38-39; see TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD, supra note
3, app. A (listing the statutes used to prosecute terrorism offenses, including those
not directly related to terrorism or national security).
113. Demleitner, supra note ii, at 39.
114. Dep't ofJustice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terror-
ism: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 310 (2001) (statement
of John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen. of the United States); see also Robert M. Chesney, The
Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 1, 26-34 (2005) (discussing the Department of Justice's emphasis on
prevention post-9/11).
115. Homeland Defense: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 9
(2001) (statement of John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen. of the United States).
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States, from providing material support or resources to foreign organizations [or
individuals] that engage in terrorist activities.""' Material support includes any
tangible or intangible property or service, including training or expert advice or
assistance."'
The two statutes are similar, but serve distinct purposes. Section 2339A does
not require that material "support be given to a designated foreign terrorist or-
ganization because Congress intended it to cover the provision of ... support to
even non-designated terrorist organizations, so long as such support was pro-
vided in furtherance of the specified crimes.""' In this sense, section 2339A func-
tions like a terrorism-aiding-and-abetting statute."9 "Prior to 9/11, § 2339A was
rarely used; but in the years since the 9/11 attacks, over twenty defendants have
been charged with at least fifty offenses under § 2339A."2 0
Even so, section 2339A has been used less frequently than section 2339B,
which prohibits material support to organizations formally designated as "for-
eign terrorist organizations"'2 ' (FTOs) by the Secretary of State.2 2 Like section
116. H.R. REP. No. 104-383, at 58 (1995).
117. The U.S. Code defines the term "material support or resources" to include "any
property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instru-
ments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or
assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications
equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (i or more
individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine
or religious materials." 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (2012). On December 17, 2004, Con-
gress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA), which
amended the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). In enacting
IRTPA, Congress amended the definition of "material support or resources" to in-
clude an additional ban on providing "service." Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6603, 118 Stat.
3762, 3762 (2004) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)). Congress also defined for the
first time the terms "training" and "expert advice or assistance," § 6603, ni8 Stat. at
3762 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(2)-(3)), and clarified the prohibition against
providing "personnel" to designated organizations, § 6603, 118 Stat. at 3762 (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h) (2012)).
118. ZABEL & BENJAMIN, infra note 122, at 32.
119. Chesney, supra note 114, at 12-13.
120. ZABEL & BENJAMIN, infra note 122, at 32.
121. See CHARLEs DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TERRORIST MATERIAL SUPPORT: A
SKETCH OF 18 U.S.C. 2339A AND 2339B, at 26 (2010). A "Foreign Terrorist Organi-
zation" is an organization designated as such pursuant to section 219 of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act. Id. To qualify, the organization must either engage in
"terrorist activity," as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (B) (2012), engage in "terror-
ism," as defined in 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2012), or "retain the capability and in-
tent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism." 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (1)(B) (2012).
122. RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING
TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 32 (2008).
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2339A, section 2339B was rarely used before 9/11.123 Since then, however, the gov-
ernment has used it extensively to "prosecute an organization's foot soldiers and
sympathizers."12 4
In many ways, section 2339B is more powerful than section 2339A, and in-
tentionally so. It was enacted to close perceived loopholes in section 2339A that
permitted those who claimed they were merely donating to charity to escape a
material support charge. 125 That loophole was closed by the adoption of a partic-
ular mens rea requirement, which was crafted to capture a broad spectrum of
conduct, along a rather generous time horizon relative to the commission of the
putative offense. Specifically, to be convicted of section 2339B, the government
need only prove that the defendant knew that the organization at issue was an
FTO or, more simply, knew that the organization is or was somehow involved
with terrorism or terrorist acts."' To reiterate: to violate section 2339B, an indi-
vidual merely has to know that the recipient of the support or resources is en-
gaged with terrorism-it is irrelevant whether a defendant knows how or to what
end the support or resources will be used. By extension, even if the individual
intends for support or resources to be used lawfully (or is ambivalent and igno-
rant as to their end-use), he is still guilty of section 2339B if he has knowledge of
the organization's illicit raison d'tre. 1
Finally, the preventative power of both sections 2339A and 2339B is bolstered
by their extraterritorial reach-they extend to anyone in the United States, to
offenses that occur at least in part in the United States, and to offenses that affect
interstate commerce.' 8 That statutory language thus captures conduct commit-
ted abroad, by defendants acting entirely abroad.
123. Id. at 35.
124. Id. (quoting Tom Stacey, The "Material Support" Offense: The Use of Strict Liability
in the War Against Terror, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 461, 463 (2005)).
125. McLoughlin, supra note 4, at 65.
126. As amended, AEDPA now provides in part: "Whoever knowingly provides material
support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to
do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both,
and, if the death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or
for life." 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
127. See David H. Pendle, Charity of the Heart and Sword: The Material Support Offense
and Personnel Guilt, 30 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 777, 777-78 (2007). Challenges to the
statute based on that knowledge standard have been uniformly rejected. See, e.g.,
United States v. Assi, 414 F. Supp. 2d 707, 718 (E.D. Mich. 2006); United States v.
Marzook, No. 03-CR-0978, 2005 WL 3095543 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2005); United States
v. Paracha, No. 03-cr-1197, 2004 WL 1900336 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2004).
128. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(d).
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Precisely because they are so amenable to prosecuting inchoate terrorist of-
fenses, the material support statutes have been one of the most widely used pros-
ecutorial tools in al Qaeda-related cases.' 9 One study reviewing 107 post-9/11
prosecutions of international Islamist terrorism filed between September 11, 2007
and December 31, 2011 found that material support charges were by far the most
common and yielded a conviction rate of over ninety percent.130 In a more recent
study, conducted in 2011, the NYU Center on Law and Security reviewed 1,054
"terror-related" cases, 131 with a focus on 578 cases that involved "violent and non-
violent crimes, all inspired by jihadist ideas." 32 This empirical research also found
that the material support statutes were among the most common charges to have
been brought against terrorist operatives, particularly since 2009.133 The NYU re-
port found an eighty-seven percent conviction rate with an average sentence of
fourteen years.134 These data confirm that material support charges are a critical
component of the executive's strategy of preventative prosecutions.
Given the government's embrace of the criminal law strategy, the continued
use of the military system for trial and punishment is unlikely.135 Yet rejection of
that forum has its drawbacks. Most notably, pushing aside the military context
wholesale has also pushed into obscurity its sources of law and reference point:
the military and international laws and customs of war. As a result, that perspec-
tive has been largely absent from the civilian courts' approach to punishment.
The next Part argues that this loss of perspective makes for poor sentencing policy
with an adverse impact on national security.
II. CIVILIAN COURTS' PUNISHMENTS IN THE WAR ON TERROR
129. As others have noted, however, the DOJ's preventive strategy sometimes requires
prosecutions for offenses that are not, on their face, linked to terrorism, particularly
where material support prosecutions might "reveal publicly that [the government]
believes that the defendant is connected to terrorism." ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra
note 122, at 51. "This strategy has proved effective because individuals who enter the
United States to commit terrorist acts are likely to violate other laws, including stat-
utes regarding immigration, financial, or credit-card fraud, or the laws related to
procuring false documents or making false statements to federal officials." Id.
130. Id. at 23, 28, 58.
131. Terror-related cases are defined as "all federal criminal prosecutions since Septem-
ber 11, 2001 that the Justice Department claims are terror- related." TERRORIST
TRIAL REPORT CARD, supra note 3, at 7.
132. Id.
133. In particular, the report found that "[s]ince 2007, material support has gone from
being charged in 11. 6 % of cases to 69.4% in 2010." Id. at 19. As of September 2011,
87.5 percent of cases involved a material support charge. Id.
134. Id. at 7.
135. See Chad Bray & Ashby Jones, Arrest Raises Issues of Where To Try Terror Suspects,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SBlooo4241278873245
82804578346632329504930.html.
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Part I discussed the United States' historical experience with the laws and
customs of war, and its efforts to adapt those laws to the War on Terror. Part II
explores these efforts further, particularly where punishment is concerned,
through the United States Sentencing Guidelines for international terrorism.136 It
argues that the Sentencing Guidelines, which were designed with domestic crim-
inal law concerns in mind, are not for use in war or armed conflict.3 The terror-
ism guidelines do not interface with the laws and customs of war or consider the
executive's broader military strategy for fighting the global War on Terror.
Part II argues for a revision and perspective shift. It first explains how the
Sentencing Guidelines currently operate in War on Terror cases and demon-
strates how their application is inappropriate to this conflict's context, from both
legal and policy perspectives. It then urges development of a new law of sentenc-
ing, still within the Sentencing Guidelines framework, but more appropriately
designed to address the exigencies of the War on Terror. Even though the Sen-
tencing Guidelines operate within the criminal law framework, as applied to pun-
ish terrorists, they are inextricable from the United States' objectives in the con-
flict with al Qaeda. Bearing that in mind, there is a proper place for law-of-war
and military-justice principles in any sentencing paradigm that punishes these
crimes of terror.
Part II then identifies which of these principles and sentencing purposes
should inform a revision of the Sentencing Guidelines. It also addresses several
examples from the case law to illustrate why the current guidelines system fails to
serve the objectives of this conflict, which include the desire to punish criminals
and the aim of stopping terrorism.
A. The Sentencing Guidelines and International Terrorism Cases
1. The Sentencing Guidelines Framework: The "Terrorism Enhance-
ment"
After the Supreme Court's 2005 decision in United States v. Booker' and the
related cases that followed in its wake, federal courts are required to consider the
136. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified in scat-
tred sections of 18 & 28 U.S.C.).
137. See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative His-
tory of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 230-51 (1993).
138. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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Sentencing Guidelines in fashioning an initial sentencing range. That range de-
rives from the calculation and cross-referencing of a "base offense level" and a
"criminal history" category, and serves as the sentencing court's starting point,
from which the court has discretion to "depart" or "vary" upward or downward
to arrive at the final sentence it will impose.13 9 In civilian court prosecutions of
War on Terror cases, the Sentencing Guidelines are used to sentence terrorists as
well.
In 1994, Congress directed the Sentencing Commission to create an "En-
hancement" in the Sentencing Guidelines for sentences resulting from crimes in-
volving international terrorism.140 The Terrorism Enhancement was expanded to
its current form in 1996 when Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and again in 200u by the PATRIOT Act. 141
The result, included as section 3A1.4 in the Sentencing Guidelines, is com-
monly known as the "Terrorism Enhancement." Though the PATRIOT Act re-
vised the Terrorism Enhancement after 9/11 to expand the range of qualifying
conduct, 42 for the most part, it has basically remained the same since its incep-
tion. It provides: "[if] the offense is a felony that involved, or was intended to
promote, a federal crime of terrorism, increase by 12 levels; but if the resulting
offense level is less than 32, increase to level 32. "143 The enhancement therefore
applies in two scenarios: one, where the sentencing court finds that the defend-
ant's offense "involved" or was "intended to promote" a federal crime of terror-
139. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338
(2007).
140. McLoughlin, supra note 4, at 51. The enhancement went into effect in November
1995, pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
which directed the Sentencing Commission to "provide an appropriate enhance-
ment for felonies involving international terrorism."Id. at 59 (internal quotation
makrs omitted).
141. Id. at 51, 60. The USA PATRIOT Act, effective November i, 2002, made the en-
hancement apply to offenses which include the harboring or concealing of a terror-
ist who has committed a crime of terrorism and obstructing the investigation of a
crime of terrorism. The PATRIOT Act also expanded the enhancement to apply
where the offensive conduct "involved" terrorism, but the actual offense of convic-
tion was not one enumerated in the definition of a federal crime of terrorism. Ad-
ditionally, the PATRIOT Act amended Application Note i (one of a number of sup-
porting, explanatory notes in the Guidelines) to indicate that the enhancement can
apply to any criminal act where the goal is to influence the conduct of government
by intimidation or coercion, or to intimidate or coerce a civilian population. Ap-
plication Note 4 was amended to allow for an upward departure, even if the en-
hancement does not otherwise apply, provided that the final sentence does not ex-
ceed the top of the Guidelines' range had it been adjusted under section 3A1.4 of
the Guidelines. McLoughlin, supra note 4, at 6o-61.
142. See supra note 141.
143. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (2002).
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ism; or two, where the court finds the offense was "calculated to influence or af-
fect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion," even if there was
no "federal crime of terrorism." 44 Notably, the Terrorism Enhancement defines
a "federal crime of terrorism" by that same standard, with reference to 18 U.S.C.
§ 2332b(g) (5), as one that: "is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of gov-
ernment by intimidation or coercion" (and is also a violation of a range of enu-
merated offenses).145
In addition to the Terrorism Enhancement, the current guidelines, as
amended by the PATRIOT Act, now set a specific base-offense level for crimes of
international terrorism. Now, for example, providing material support to a for-
eign terrorist organization (i.e., a conviction under sections 2339A or 2339B) car-
ries a base-offense level of 26, which amounts to a term of imprisonment of 63-
78 months for a defendant who falls in Criminal History Category I, and 120-150
months imprisonment for a defendant in Criminal History Category VI.146
When the Terrorism Enhancement is applied after the initial guidelines cal-
culation (again, which accounts for the base-offense level and criminal history
category), the base-offense level increases by 12 points-but by no less than 32
points-and the Criminal History Category increases to VI.'47 Given that ratchet,
there is no question that the operation of the Terrorism Enhancement yields
longer periods of incarceration in the cases where it applies. Imposing longer sen-
tences on terrorist operatives is certainly not undesirable per se, and, as the next
Part argues, is necessary in certain cases. But there are other legal and policy prob-
lems with the Terrorism Enhancement and the guidelines framework in which it
sits, which leave their legitimacy open to criticism.
2. The Problems with the Terrorism Enhancement
The guidelines framework, and the Terrorism Enhancement in particular,
raises several concerns.148 Chief among them is the Sentencing Guidelines' failure
to consider sources of international and military law even though, at bottom,
these guidelines purport to constrain the scope of the United States' authority to
144. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g) (5) (2012) (emphasis added).
145. Id.
146. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 2M5.2 & Sentencing Tbl. (2012). There is
a base-offense level of 28 for offenses involving nuclear material, weapons, or facil-
ities; biological agents, toxins, or delivery systems; chemical weapons; other weap-
ons of mass destruction; attempt; or conspiracy. Id. § 2M6.1. The base level is 42 if
the offense was committed with intent to injure the United States or aid a foreign
nation or foreign terrorist organization. Id. Criminal History Category is deter-
mined by a defendant's number of criminal history "points," which is usually a
function of his number of prior offenses. Id. § 4A1.1.
147. Id. § 3A1.4 & Sentencing Tbl. (2002); see Doyle, supra note 121, at ii.
148. McLoughlin, supra note 4, at 57 ("U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 represents bad anti-terror-
ism policy for several reasons.").
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punish international terrorists. In addition, to the extent the Sentencing Guide-
lines purport to apply U.S. law to punish terrorism, the tension between them
and other statutory and constitutional law is equally problematic.
a. The Terrorism Enhancement Ignores Military and International Law
The Sentencing Guidelines do not acknowledge that terrorism in the War on
Terror is different from other crimes-or, even, from isolated incidents of ter-
rorism unrelated to the War on Terror. In these cases, the judiciary operates as
part of an interbranch war strategy of preventatively prosecuting cases of terror-
ism, which inevitably involves the courts in carrying out the political and military
objectives at stake in the War on Terror.
Were these cases tried by military commissions, law-of-war principles would
be relevant in several respects. 149 For one, the question of whether a law of war
has been breached determines if an offense is triable by military commission in
the first instance.5 o Moreover, both the Bush and Obama Administrations and
the Supreme Court believe that the laws of war apply to at least some aspects of
this conflict, such as where the authority to detain and the conditions of that de-
tention are concerned.' It stands to reason, then, that where civilian courts have
149. The sources of the law are understood to include "customary principles and rules
of international law, international agreements, judicial decisions by both national
and international tribunals, national manuals of military law, scholarly treatises,
and resolutions of various international bodies." ELSEA, supra note 29, at 6. "The
law of war is also sometimes known as the 'law of armed conflict' or 'international
humanitarian law."' Id. at 7; see Rona, supra note 33, at 55 n.1.
150. The case of Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012), questioned
whether the material support statutes could properly be considered war crimes sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of a military tribunal. It held that the international law of
war does not recognize material support to terrorism as a war crime, but that the
U.S. Congress does. Id. at 1240.
151. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004);
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004); see Geoffrey Corn & Eric Talbot Jen-
sen, Transnational Armed Conflict: A "Principled" Approach to the Regulation of
Counter-Terror Combat Operations, 42 ISR. L. REV. 46, 68 (2009) ("When ... sub-
mission [of the opponent] results in the opponent falling under the control of his
enemy, detention and treatment during detention become critical regulatory con-
cerns."); see also Miles P. Fischer, Applicability of the Geneva Conventions to "Armed
Conflict" in the War on Terror, 30 FORDHAM J. INT'L L. 509 (20o6). Notably, the
Obama Administration does not consider the geographic scope of the conflict, for
purposes of LOAC, to be limited to "hot" battlefields. See John 0. Brennan, Assis-
tant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Remarks on
Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws (Sept. 16, 2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2o11/o9/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-
strengthening- our- security- adhering- our -values -an.
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stepped into the adjudicative shoes of the military branch, they too have some
obligation to consider the laws and customs of war.
Even more specifically, the laws of war could be seen as relevant to criminal
sentencing insofar as sentencing is a particular use of force in conflict. As a gen-
eral matter, the LOAC is understood to govern the use of force in armed con-
flict.153 And punishment and force are hard to divorce in the War on Terror. Im-
prisonment in this conflict is, after all, an exercise of force that furthers the
operational objectives of detention and incapacitation, even if it is also used to
punish these criminal acts. The civilian courts' imprisonment serves other argu-
able military objectives too, such as signaling to the terrorist defendant's cohorts
that terrorists will be targeted for punishment when caught fighting unlawfully
against the United States. On this view, it is difficult to dispute that the laws of
war are relevant to the civilian courts' sentencing practices.
Yet there is no indication that the Sentencing Commission considered the
UCMJ, which incorporates the LOAC and international law of war in general, 15 4
or how those bodies of law operate in the context of the conflict with al Qaeda,
when drafting the Terrorism Enhancement and related Sentencing Guidelines
provisions. Nor do the guidelines reflect military-justice principles of sentencing.
In fact, the operation of the Terrorism Enhancement is directly at odds with the
sentencing procedures used by the War on Terror military commissions, which
require that the jury deliberate and decide the sentence to be imposed.' 5 Under
that system, juries consider, among other things, "evidence in aggravation,"
152. To be clear, this Article does not conflate the military- and criminal-law systems,
but rather urges some role for law-of-war, and related military-justice, principles
to influence the application of the criminal- sentencing law in situations of armed
conflict. The law of war is a lex specialis, triggered by an armed conflict, and there-
fore arguably applicable to the War on Terror. The view of the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross is that, even where applicable, the LOAC does not displace
conflicting lex generalis, like domestic criminal law, "which is also capable of cov-
ering war crimes." Rona, supra note 33, at 56 n.3. In short, there is room to include
the law of war's core principles in the domestic sentencing analysis, particularly in
situations where this lex specialis could be said to apply.
153. See, e.g., Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM.
J. INT'L L. 391, 391 (1993).
154. See UNIF. CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE R. 201(a)(b) (providing for courts-martial
jurisdiction over persons who violate the laws of war).
155. See Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 21, which requires that, "unless impracti-
cable, the rules for military commissions be the same as the rules for courts-martial
used to try members of the U.S. armed forces." See UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY
JUSTICE R. ooo(b)-(d) (establishing the procedure for jury sentencing and deline-
ating what factors that the just may consider); see also supra notes 96-ioo and ac-
companying text (explaining that juries have been used to sentence in the military
commissions used in the War on Terror).
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"matter in extenuation," and "evidence of rehabilitative potential.""' By its pro-
cedural nature, military jury sentencing affords for a more factored and gradated
sentencing analysis than does the current guidelines approach.
b. The Terrorism Enhancement Diverges from Domestic Law
As applied to War on Terror cases, the Sentencing Guidelines also seem in
tension with U.S. statutory law. In particular, the operation of the Terrorism En-
hancement is inconsistent with the statutes that criminalize terroristic acts. 7 One
source of that inconsistency is the irrelevancy to the Terrorism Enhancement of
a defendant's motivation for committing the offense, while the statutes them-
selves often distinguish between violent and financial crimes."' Consider, for in-
stance, the varying penalties in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2332a, 2332b, and 2332d. Section 2332a,
which addresses the use of weapons of mass destruction, provides for a prison
sentence of "any term of years or for life"; and, if death results, the offender may
be sentenced to death.' 9 Section 233 2b deals with acts of terrorism "transcending
national boundaries"' and criminalizes killing, kidnapping, or maiming any
person in the United States, as well as any assault on a person in the United States
that results in serious bodily harm or is conducted with a deadly weapon.'6 ' The
maximum penalty for those crimes ranges from ten years (for threats to commit
those offenses), thirty years (for a related assault resulting in serious bodily in-
jury), thirty-five years (for maiming), life imprisonment (for kidnapping), to the
death penalty (if a death results). 6 Section 2332d addresses the financial crimes
of any individual in the United States who "knows or has reasonable cause to
know that ... a country [is] supporting international terrorism" and enters into
a financial transaction with that country's government.16 3 The maximum penalty
for that crime is ten years in prison.164
156. UNIF. CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE R. ooo(b)(4)(5), 1ooo(c).
157. See generally McLoughlin, supra note 4 (making this argument).
158. ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 122, at 41.
159. 18 U.S.C. § 2332a (2012).
16o. Legislative history shows that Congress had in mind terrorist acts that "are in some
fashion or degree instigated, commanded, or facilitated from outside the United
States." 141 CONG. REC. 11,958 (1995) (statement of Thomas Daschle); see also H.R.
REP. No. 104-383, at 83 (1995) (" [O]nly those terrorist crimes that are truly trans-
national in scope will be prosecuted under this section.").
161. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(C) (1) (2012).
162. Id. For examples of cases prosecuted under this statute, see, for example, United
States v. Bin Laden, 93 F. Supp. 2d 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); and United States v. Reid,
206 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D. Mass. 2002).
163. 18 U.S.C. § 2332d(a) (2012).
164. Id.
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The material support statutes, which play a central role in these terrorism
prosecutions, similarly distinguish between violent and financial conduct. Sec-
tion 2339A initially set the maximum penalty at ten years, and was amended by
the PATRIOT Act to allow a maximum of fifteen years, or life imprisonment if a
death results.' Section 2339B allows for a maximum sentence of fifteen years, or
life imprisonment if a death results.' 6 Section 2339C, which was enacted as part
of the Anti-Terrorism Convention of 2002,6 punishes the provision of funds
when one knows or intends that they will be used for terrorism."' Section 2339C
distinguishes between defendants who know or intend that the funds will be so
used, and those who do not act knowingly.6 9 If the government proves that the
defendant acted with the intent that the funds be used-or with knowledge that
funds will be used-to fund a specific act of terrorism, the maximum penalty is
twenty years.17
Based on the penalties delimited by the statutes themselves, it seems clear
that "Congress did not intend to punish a financial supporter of a[n ]FTO or
organization that commits a terrorist act as severely as an individual who com-
mits the act itself.""' As others have observed, by" [ciharting these and other anti-
terrorism statutes, it appears that the penalties are meant to be proportional to
the culpability of the conduct, to the injury that can be directly attributed to a
defendant's actions, and to the nature of the organization's actions."1 In view of
the statutory scheme that seems to treat separately financial and ideological ter-
rorism, it is troubling that the Terrorism Enhancement provides no explicit gra-
dation where motives are concerned.
The Sentencing Guidelines applied to al Qaeda terrorism also suffer consti-
tutional infirmities. The right to trial by jury is one constitutional sticking point
165. Id. § 2339A(a); see Doyle, supra note 121, at 2.
166. 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1) (2012).
167. Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Convention Implementation Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-197, §§ 202-203, 116 Stat. 724, 724-28.
168. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(1)-(2) (2012).
169. Id. § 2339C(a) (1) (imposing knowledge requirement for conviction).
170. Id. § 2339C(d).
171. McLoughlin, supra note 4, at 68.
172. Id. at 68-69 & tbl. i. As pointed out in the National Journal, "Critics of the terrorism
enhancement have seized on this issue of congressional intent to argue that the
courts have veered into forbidden territory." Shane Harris, The Terrorism Enhance-
ment: An Obscure Law Stretches the Definition of Terrorism, and Metes Out Severe
Punishments, NAT L J., July 13, 2007, http://shaneharris.com
/magazinestories/terrorism- enhancement- obscure -law- stretches-the- definition-
of -terrorism -and-metes- out- severe -punishments. In any event, "[b]y all accounts,
Congress hasn't examined use of the terrorism enhancement since it created it more
than a decade ago." Id.
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for the Terrorism Enhancement in particular. Where material support, for in-
stance, is charged,' the government only needs to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that a defendant knowingly provided support or resources to an FTO. But
there is no requirement that the jury also find the defendant knew the funds
would be used to support terrorism. Meanwhile, it is a judge, applying the pre-
ponderance- of-the- evidence standard, that decides whether the enhancement
applies. If the judge finds, without the jury, that the defendant "calculated" his
actions to "influence or affect the conduct of government" (or to retaliate against
government conduct), the enhancement may apply to skyrocket the sentence for
which the defendant is eligible.174
That basic sentencing scenario, which involves a court's power to increase a
criminal sentence by reference to facts not found by the jury, was held unconsti-
tutional in Apprendi v. New Jersey."' There, the Supreme Court judged such prac-
tice unconstitutional'76 as a "departure from the jury tradition that is an indis-
pensable part of our criminal justice system."' The Court's analysis was steeped
in historical reflection: it noted that, at common law, "[j]ust as the circumstances
of the crime and the intent of the defendant at the time of commission were often
essential elements to be alleged in the indictment, so too were the circumstances
mandating a particular punishment."' Similar concerns lurk in the background
of the sentencing regime considered here,'79 where the application of the Terror-
ism Enhancement turns on facts not found by a jury, but rather by the court on
173. This is true at least with respect to prosecutions under section 2339B.
174. Doyle, supra note 121, at 12 (discussing the operation and application of the Terror-
ism Enhancement).
175. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
176. Since Apprendi, the Supreme Court has stated clearly that, " [w]hether the judge's
authority to impose an enhanced sentence depends on finding a specified fact (as
in Apprendi), one of several specified facts . . . or any aggravating fact (as here), it
remains the case that the jury's verdict alone does not authorize the sentence."
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2004).
177. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497.
178. Id. at 480.
179. As McLoughlin argues,
No one should doubt that the framers would be troubled by a judge ruling
that a sentence that would be no more than fifty-seven months under the
Sentencing Guidelines based upon the findings of the jury rises to i8o
months based upon a district court judge's findings, under a preponder-
ance of the evidence standard, that the defendant intended to "influence
or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion."
McLoughlin, supra note 4, at 86-87 (citing United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316,
356 (4th Cir. 2004) (Motz., J., dissenting)).
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a preponderance of the evidence, and drastically increases the defendant's sen-
tence when it applies.'
There are due process concerns with the Sentencing Guidelines as well,
where they apply to punish terrorist conduct with a remote connection to the
United States. In general, whether a criminal statute applies to conduct outside
the United States requires a "nexus" to the United States, which "ensures that a
United States court will assert jurisdiction only over a defendant who should rea-
sonably anticipate being haled into court in this country.""'
The nexus test gets hazy in many War on Terror cases. Compared to acts of
terrorism committed within the United States (or those obviously directed at the
United States), in some cases the alleged material support was provided exclu-
sively abroad, and the defendants' connection to any U.S.-directed terrorist plot
is quite attenuated. Some defendants in these cases have challenged their indict-
ments on these grounds, arguing a lack of U.S. nexus."' Academics have also be-
gun to probe this jurisdictional question in some depth. 3' Most courts have,
however, shied away from these thorny questions and avoided resolving difficult
due process questions.184
Yet so long as these constitutional questions remain, the legitimacy of the
civilian courts' sentences hangs in some doubt, which, in turn, detracts from the
strength of U.S. counterterrorism policy. The following Section explores a way to
fix these legal and policy weaknesses in the current Sentencing Guidelines frame-
18o. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.2 & cmt. n.1 (2012) (providing
that, in multi-count convictions, a court may impose the sentences to run concur-
rently to equal the total punishment required by the Guidelines calculation, to the
extent allowed by the statute maximum for each count of conviction). Doyle, supra
note 121, at 11 (noting that the Guidelines call for application of the statutory max-
imum where a single count of conviction is concerned).
181. United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1257 (9th Cir. 1998).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F-3d 56, i (2d Cir. 2003) ("In order to apply
extraterritorially a federal criminal statute to a defendant consistent with due pro-
cess, there must be a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the United States,
so that such application would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair." (citation
omitted)). There have also been facial challenges to the statute on this ground, with
arguments that Congress exceeded its power under the Foreign Commerce Clause
to enact the material support and narcoterrorism statutes (both preventative in na-
ture). See, e.g., Memoranda in Support of Motion To Dismiss the Indictment,
United States v. Issa, No. o9-cr-1244 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 17, 2010), Dkt. Nos. 31, 35.
183. See, e.g., Solow, supra note 110; Dan E. Stigall, International Law and Limitations on
the Exercise of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in U.S. Domestic Law, 35 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 323 (2012) (providing a comprehensive review of jurisdictional
approaches to questions of extraterritoriality).
184. See generally Solow, supra note no (discussing the case law that exists and pointing
out that either the defendants have pled guilty prior to the court's resolution of a
motion to dismiss or the courts' analyses on these issues has been perfunctory).
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work. It proposes developing a new sentencing framework, born of certain sen-
tencing purposes applicable to war, and with reference to bedrock law-of-war
and military-justice principles. Such a normative framework could, in turn, ani-
mate a new set of sentencing guidelines for punishing criminal offenses perpe-
trated in the War on Terror.
B. Punishing Terrorism: Purposes and Principles
Any theoretical foundation for a new set of sentencing guidelines for terror-
ism requires a grasp on why the United States has chosen to punish terrorists in
civilian courts."' This Section thus begins with the traditional criminal law pur-
poses of deterrence and incapacitation, as those purposes are central to the War
on Terror strategy. Building from these purposes, this Section considers how cer-
tain bedrock principles of war-proportionality and necessity-as well as related
military justice principles-mitigating and aggravating circumstances-can be
applied to the criminal-law setting and used to develop a new sentencing policy
for punishing criminal acts of terrorism.
1. The Purposes of Punishment in the War on Terror
The first reason for punishment in the War on Terror is plainly to prevent
and deter terrorism. In general, deterrence-whether of the general public or the
specific offender-aims to prevent crime by instilling fear of punishment.' De-
terrence has a role in wartime punishment as well, and was historically one of the
principal reasons for punishing war criminals.'8 ' Deterrence was, for instance, of
185. General sentencing theory identifies several basic purposes of sentencing, including
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Retribution is also one basis for pun-
ishment, though in the context of war,
[t]he satisfaction of instincts of revenge and retribution for the sake of ret-
ribution are obviously the least sound basis of punishment. If punishment
is to lead to progress, it must be carried out in a manner which world opin-
ion will regard as progressive and as consistent with the fundamental mo-
rality of the [American] case.
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 14 (1992) (quoting Nuremburg Prosecutor Robert H. Jackson).
186. GAIL A. CAPUTO, INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS IN CORRECTIONS 15 (2004).
187. As Professor Mark Weisburd summarizes,
Punishment is inflicted on the basis of individual guilt and justified as
deterrence; as removing from society, at least temporarily, a person whose
choice to commit a criminal act despite the various costs of doing so
suggests that the person may choose to commit other such acts; and, as far
as some people are concerned, as justly punishing bad behavior.
Mark Weisburd, Al-Qaeda and the Law of War, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1063,1071.
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paramount importance at Nuremburg. As Prosecutor Robert H. Jackson under-
scored,
Punishment of war criminals should be motivated primarily by its de-
terrent effect, by the impetus which it gives to improved standards of
international conduct and, if the theory of punishment is broad enough,
by the implicit condemnation of ruthlessness and unlawful force as in-
struments of attaining national ends.' 8
The UN war crimes tribunals also recognized deterrence as an important reason
to punish.8 9
Deterrence is an extremely important objective in the current conflict, in
which the punishment imposed should address the defendants as both criminals
and unlawful combatants. Ordinarily, deterrence has little relevance to combat-
ants, particularly where the detention of prisoners of war is concerned, as lawful
combatants are not considered criminals. 9 o Terrorism, however, is a different
sort of fight, one that is very much driven in certain cases by ideological fervor.
There is also much more at stake behind the deterrence objective here. Compared
to ordinary crime, the inability to deter comes at a greater societal price in the
War on Terror. Ordinary criminal violence is "perpetrated by relatively small
groups of individuals for private ends."' 9' International terrorism, in contrast, is
perpetrated by an extensive, interconnected network, as a means to a specific,
ideologically driven end. 92 Unlike ordinary crime, where "the material effects on
society at large are generally limited,"'93 the material effects of terrorism on
American and global societies at large are much more pervasive.194
188. BASSIOUNI, supra note 185, at 14 (quoting Nuremburg Prosecutor Robert H. Jack-
son).
189. See Schabas, supra note 43, at 498 (" [R] eferring implicitly to the notion of deter-
rence, the Security Council affirmed its conviction that the work of the two tribu-
nals will contribute to ensuring that such violations are halted." (internal quotation
marks omitted)); id. at 504 ("For the three members of the Trial Chamber, deter-
rence and retribution are decisive in determining a fit sentence.").
190. See Yin, supra note 91, at 168.
191. Weisburd, supra note 187, at 1069.
192. See id. (" [I]ndividuals take part in war, not as free agents, but as part of a [terrorist]
organization..
193. Id.
194. As Weisburd aptly frames it,
[W]ar either threatens the state with losses many orders of magnitude
greater than those caused by crime or offers the state opportunities to
make gains so great as to exceed the expected costs of war, as large as those
costs necessarily are. It is therefore important for the state to take positive
action either to defend itself or to attack . . . in order either to avoid the
threatened future harm or ensure the possible future gain. War . . . must
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And, importantly, terrorism can be deterred. "With the exception of a rela-
tively small group of decision- makers," terrorist operatives "participate as agents,
not as initiators."' 95 These "[i]ndividual participants understand ... that war is
not intended to and almost surely will not advance their individual interests ex-
cept to the extent that they identify with the interests of the entities they serve."'*9
Deterring international terrorism thus depends on the United States' ability to
sever offenders' ideological ties to a larger terrorist network. Without those ties
of ideology and allegiance, the interest in perpetrating these crimes diminishes.
If deterrence speaks to a strategy of prevention, incapacitation speaks to a
strategy of submission.'9 The detention-or incapacitation-of an enemy sol-
dier has always been a critical component of a war effort while hostilities are on-
going. The conflict with al Qaeda continues-and so as much as the civilian sys-
tem is used to prevent and deter these crimes, it must also be used to incapacitate
its perpetrators.
Incapacitation is perhaps even more important in the War on Terror than in
the conventional wars in which the United States has engaged given the degree to
which ideology motivates its fighters. In conventional wars, lawful combatants
are generally not personally dangerous, and there is no reason to think they
would "continue efforts to injure the state holding them captive once the author-
ities they served have agreed to stop fighting. "9' With al Qaeda fighters, however,
the "picture ... is mixed."'99 The group's goals are "purely political."0 0 And,
"[t]hough almost surely unachievable, these goals include absolute opposition to
the United States and a determination to kill as many Americans as possible." 20'
This suggests that, other things equal, terrorist defendants' motivation to return
to the "battlefield," if ideologically committed, will be stronger than those en-
gaged in more conventional hostilities with a foreign power.
Lastly, as an aid to the objective of deterrence, rehabilitation also has a role
in sentencing terrorist offenders. Admittedly, the idea of rehabilitating criminals
in any context is subject to considerable debate. Critics have pointed out its "con-
have an ex ante focus: it must be an effort to actively shape the future ra-
ther than merely respond to events in the past.
Id. at 1071; see Ruth Wedgwood, Combatants or Criminals, in THE U.S. vs. AL
QAEDA 142, 144 (Gideon Rose & Jonathan Tepperman eds., 2011).
195. Weisburd, supra note 187, at 1069.
196. Id. (emphasis added).
197. Incapacitation is premised on the ability to exercise control over the criminal in
order to prevent his ability to harm society. Selective incapacitation is a decision to
target "high risk" or "career criminals." CAPUTO, supra note 186, at 15-16.
198. Weisburd, supra note 187, at 1071.
199. Id. at 1082.
200. Id. at io8i.
201. Id.
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ceptual weakness," that "[v] agueness and ambiguity shroud its most basic sup-
positions."' 0 ' Chief among its conceptual problems-particularly where terror-
ism is concerned-is an ignorance of "how to prevent criminal recidivism by
changing the characters and behaviour of offenders."203
Yet despite its conceptual thorniness, both the military and international
communities bear rehabilitation in mind in their sentencing practices. For in-
stance, the rules governing the operation of the UN war crimes tribunals provide
explicitly for the consideration of rehabilitative purposes. Those tribunals' gov-
erning statutes incorporate reference to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which requires that "[t]he penitentiary system[s] shall comprise
treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and
social rehabilitation."2 0 4 The U.S. military also considers rehabilitative options in
sentencing. The UCMJ instructs the jury in sentencing to consider " [e]vidence of
rehabilitative potential," which "refers to the accused's potential to be restored,
through vocational, correctional, or therapeutic training or other corrective place
in society."20 s
In some limited fashion, the theory could thus prove to be instructive to the
normative rationale used for punishing in the War on Terror. At the least, inclu-
sion of some rehabilitative considerations would focus the sentencing courts on
the long-term objectives of this war, which include diminishing the root causes
of terrorism. And an effort to develop a sentencing framework that also addresses
the underlying reasons for terroristic involvement would provide for a more im-
pactful and lasting deterrent effect.
2. The Principled Bases for Punishment in the War on Terror
To build up from that theoretical foundation, a new sentencing framework
requires principles of law to guide and to justify it. Here, those principles should
be reasonableness (proportionality and necessity), and mitigating (and aggravat-
ing) circumstances.
Proportionality and necessity are core principles in the law of war'206 and
govern the legality of the use of force in armed conflict. Pursuant to them, force
202. FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY
AND SOCIAL PURPOSES 51 (1981).
203. Id at 34.
204. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S.
171.
205. UNIF. CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE R. 1001(b)(5).
206. Those concepts have distinctive meaning in the contexts of jus ad bellum and jus in
bello. Corn, supra note 94, at 6-7; see NEW WARS, NEW LAWS? APPLYING THE LAWS
OF WAR IN 21ST CENTURY CONFLICTS (David Wippman & Matthew Evangelista
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used to achieve a military objective'20 is deemed lawful where it is "not forbidden
by international law" and "indispensible for securing the complete submission of
the enemy as soon as possible."20s
In war, therefore, much is justified by the principle of necessity. Under
Lieber's Code, military necessity justified " [v] irtually any use of force."o 9 Today,
the jus ad bellum is understood to "restrict[] resort to force by states to situations
of absolute necessity," at which point a state "may use only that amount of force
absolutely necessary to meet the threat and restore the status quo ante of secu-
rity.""o But under the jus in bello, a state has "the authority to employ all
measures not otherwise prohibited by international law to bring about prompt
submission of the enemy," including deadly force as a matter of first resort."
Proportionality tempers necessity. In the jus in bello, proportionality weighs
the collective effects of force against the state's operational goals. As such, it
"must be framed by the broader concept of how it contributes to the legitimate
operational objective of compelling enemy submission."2 1 2 Proportionality has
even broader relevance to civilian sentencing courts. 1 3 It is embedded in the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, 1 4 where the "reasonableness" clause
eds., 2005); Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International Con-
stitutional Moment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2002); John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI.
L. REV. 729 (2004); John B. Bellinger, Legal Adviser to the U.S. Dep't of State,
Speech at Oxford University: Prisoners in War: Contemporary Challenges to the
Geneva Conventions (Dec. io, 2007), http://www.state.gov/s/l/rls/96687.htm.
207. It should be noted that military objectives have dual meaning both in legal and
policy parlance and this Article. As a legal term of art, a "military objective" is that
which qualifies as a proper target under the law of war, and is defined as "objects
which by their nature, location, purpose or use, make an effective contribution to
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in
the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage." Protocol
I, supra note 33, art. 52, para. 2. In the more general sense of the term, and as it is
used mostly throughout this Article, "military objective" has operational meaning;
that is, it "refer[s] to a goal of a military operation." TALLIN MANUAL ON THE IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 126 (Michael N. Schmitt ed.,
2013).
208. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 33, at 11.
209. WITT, supra note 5, at 234.
210. Corn, supra note 94, at 67.
211. Id. at 68.
212. Id. at 72.
213. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 35, at 822-23.
214. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12 (1985).
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governs the legality of executive uses of force in executing laws domestically.'
And as confirmation that proportionality constrains the legality of the govern-
ment's conduct in this war, it bears repeating that the AUMF gave the President
authority to use "all necessary and appropriate force against those responsible" for
the 9/11 attacks.16
Consideration of mitigating and aggravating circumstances supports the rea-
sonableness of any punishment imposed. At international law, these principles
are long recognized. Even the Nuremburg tribunals, whose punishments were
largely unexplained or unreasoned, were known to consider aggravating and mit-
igating circumstances in fashioning a sentence. Although no aggravating factors
were specifically mentioned, research suggests that several were "implicitly" ac-
counted for: membership in the SS21 ; vicious character 218; high education and
culture levels" 9; and "consistent evasiveness during trial."2 0 As for mitigating
factors, the tribunals recognized several "justifications" and "excuses," including
"independence from the Nazis; ... active resistance to the Nazi regime;" 21 Supe-
rior orders; military considerations; legal clarity; and personal characteristics.
The UN tribunals followed this approach,2 2 3 with explicit buy-in from the United
States. 2 2 4
215. The Sentencing Guidelines already recognize the general need for proportionality
and necessity in sentencing. That requirement, known as the "parsimony require-
ment," instructs sentencing courts to impose a sentence that is "sufficient, but not
greater than necessary." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012); see A Win for the 'Parsimony
Clause' of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), SECOND CIR. SENT'G BLOG, http://federalsentenc-
ing.typepad.com/developments-in federal s/2006/12/a win
for the-p.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2013).
216. 50 U.S.C. §1541 (Supp. I) (2012) (emphasis added).
217. "No defendant who was not a member of the SS was ever sentenced to death ....
HELLER, supra note 32, at 322.
218. Id. at 322 ("even by Nazi standards").




222. Id. at 325.
223. See Schabas, supra note 43, at 463, 483, 486.
224. During the drafting of the tribunal statutes, the United States proposed that, " [i]n
reaching a sentence, the Trial Chamber shall take into account such factors as the
gravity of the offense, the individual circumstances of the convicted person, and the
evidence submitted during presentencing, such mitigating circumstances as mean-
ingful and substantial cooperation provided to the Prosecutor by the accused, and
the extent to which any penalty imposed by a national court on the same person
for the same act has already been served." Suggestions Made by the Gov. of the
United States, Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Tribunals for
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Perhaps most relevant to the terrorism context is the notion of command
responsibility, a well-known mitigating factor where military and war crimes are
concerned. That consideration "involves an assessment of where the defendant
stood within the military or civilian hierarchy."'2 The Sentencing Guidelines also
account for criminal hierarchy, and allow for sentence adjustments based on
whether the defendant played an aggravating or mitigating role in the offense.2 6
Related to a defendant's role, the strength of his commitment to the criminal
enterprise of terrorism could also present an aggravating or mitigating circum-
stance. In that regard, the Trial Chambers of the ICTY consider "substantial co-
operation" with the prosecutor and "take into account that the accused surren-
dered voluntarily to the International Tribunal, confessed, pleaded guilty,
showed sincere and genuine remorse or contrition, and stated ... willingness to
supply evidence with probative value against other individuals for crimes falling
within the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal." 2 7 Similarly, under the Sen-
tencing Guidelines, a defendant is eligible for a two-level reduction in his base-
offense level for pleading guilty.28 And if a defendant substantially cooperates
with the government, a court may depart from the Sentencing Guidelines under
section 5K, on recommendation from the government.' 9 In the terrorism setting,
a lack of ongoing ideological commitment-a possible mitigating circum-
stance-might appropriately be inferred from a defendant's acceptance of re-
sponsibility (by pleading guilty), his testimony at trial, or some other indicia of
cooperation with the government.
In many ways, the Sentencing Guidelines are part of a newly emerging law
or custom of war that applies to the War on Terror. However, as applied thus far,
to address the legal challenges involved in punishing these war criminals in civil-
ian courts, the guidelines have proven problematic-in some cases too weak, in
others too severe, but in most instances a poor guide to the courts as to what
punishment is necessary and reasonable.
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int'l Humanitar-
ian Law Committed in the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc IT/14, para 26.3; see HEL-
LER, supra note 32, at 322-23.
225. Schabas, supra note 43, at 489.
226. Section 3BL1 provides for a two- to four-point increase in the base-offense level for
an "aggravating role in the offense" and section 3B1.2 provides for a two- to four-
level decrease to the base-offense level for a mitigating role (i.e. if the defendant was
a minimal or minor participant). See Aggravating and Mitigating Role Adjustments
Primer §5  3BL & 3B1.2, U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION (2012),
http://www.ussc.gov/Legal/Primers/PrimerRoleAdjustment.pdf.
227. Schabas, supra note 43, at 496 (citation omitted).
228. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2012).
229. Id. § 5K1.1.
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C. The Cases
This Section considers the sentencing case law in the War on Terror. It de-
scribes the broad spectrum of offenses prosecuted in this conflict, demonstrating
why the Sentencing Guidelines do not provide the tools required to punish con-
duct that spans that spectrum. This Section argues that a revised sentencing
framework should provide courts with legal tools to distinguish between grada-
tions of terrorist conduct, consistent with the principles and purposes discussed
in Section II.B. In particular, as the case law reveals, courts require tools to dis-
tinguish at sentencing among a subgroup of terrorist offenders, which includes
what this Article calls terrorist "service providers," "low-level financiers," and
"sting participants."
1. The "Hard Core" of Terrorist Conduct
Some terrorist defendants, many of whom are well-known, demand sen-
tences that incapacitate indefinitely. The necessity of containing the threat such
defendants pose is, in these cases, proportional to their terroristic acts or at-
tempts, and there are no mitigating circumstances to consider.230 These defend-
ants will almost surely recidivate-that is, attempt to harm the United States
again. In their cases, detention commensurate with the duration of hostilities is
justifiable under the LOAC.
The case of Zaccharias Moussaoui, known as the "twentieth hijacker," is a
good example. Moussaoui was the only defendant directly related to the 9/11 at-
tacks to be prosecuted in civilian court. He pled guilty to section 2332b(c) (2) and
to conduct "including attending an al Qaeda-led training camp in Afghanistan in
1998, contacting U.S. flight schools by email from Malaysia, enrolling in a flight
school in Oklahoma, inquiring about beginning a crop-dusting business, pos-
sessing flight manuals for commercial aircraft, placing multiple calls from public
telephones to Germany (the location of an alleged al Qaeda terrorist cell), receiv-
ing a wire transfer of approximately $14,000 from Germany, and buying and pos-
sessing knives and fighting paraphernalia including shin guards and fighting
gloves."' Moussaoui was sentenced to life in prison.2 32
230. At least one court has used the "hardcore" label. United States v. Warsame, 537 F.
Supp. 2d 1005, 1019 (D. Minn. 2008).
231. ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 122, at 41 (citing Superseding Indictment, United
States v. Moussaoui, No. oi-CR-455 (E.D. Va. June 19, 2002), Dkt. No. 199.
232. Id. at 41-42 (citing Minute Entry, Plea, Moussaoui, No. ol-CR-455 (E.D. Va. Apr. 22,
2005); Judgment, Moussaoui, No. ol-CR-455 (E.D. Va. May 4, 2006), Dkt. No. 1854.
"He was also sentenced to four other life terms, to be served concurrently, under
the remaining counts." See Docket Description of Judgment, Moussaoui, No. ol-
CR-455 (E.D. Va. May 4, 2006), Dkt. No. 1854).
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The conduct in United States v. Cromitie is also in the hardcore camp.2 33
There, the defendant was convicted of, among other things, multiple counts of
conspiracy and attempt to use weapons of mass destruction.2 3 4 At sentencing, the
judge found that Cromitie and his codefendants had
engaged in a plot to fire missiles at U.S. military airplanes, which in-
volved, among other things, (1) surveillance at [an] Airport, (2) acquisi-
tion of what defendants erroneously believed to be real Stinger missiles,
and (3) selection of a precise location from which to fire those weapons.
Moreover, during the course of the plot, Cromitie ... made statements
that plainly confirmed [his] intent to destroy the military planes and
otherwise injure the United States.235
Cromitie was sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment.26
As a last example, in United States v. Siraj, the defendant was charged with
four counts of conspiracy related to a plot to bomb the New York City subway
station at Thirty-Fourth Street. 2 37 He was convicted by a jury and sentenced to
thirty years in prison.23
The sentences in these cases are generally consistent insofar as they are all
long-twenty- five years to life in prison. Those sentences, all of which included
an application of the Terrorism Enhancement, properly reflect Congress's deci-
sion to set terrorism-related sentences at a very high level, in recognition of the
serious danger that terrorism poses and the war that the United States is currently
fighting against the al Qaeda network. 2 39 The sentences imposed appropriately
and adequately serve the goals of incapacitation and specific deterrence of these
high-risk offenders. Life (or long) sentences in prison are proportional to the
threat they pose and, for the same reason, are necessary to ensure national secu-
rity. In short, to the extent that the Sentencing Guidelines currently advise such
lengthy and restrictive sentences on this category of offenders, the system func-
tions lawfully and effectively. Yet even where these offenders are concerned, the
guidelines system is not above policy reproach. The guidelines do not explain
precisely which cases require these lengthy sentences or elaborate the justification
for imposing them, making the sentences subject to criticism even if they are law-
ful and effective.
233. No. og-cr-558 2011 WL 2693293 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2011).
234. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2332a, 2332g (2012).
235. Cromitie, 2011 WL 2693292, at *3.
236. Benjamin Weiser, 3 Men Draw 25-Year Term in Synagogue Bomb Plot, N.Y. TIMES,
June 29, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/o6/3o/nyregion/3-men-get-25-years
-in-plot-to-bomb-bronx-synagogues.html.
237. 468 F. Supp. 2d 408, 413-14 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
238. Judgment, United States v. Siraj, No. 05-cr-00104 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2007), Dkt. No.
182.
239. See United States v. Meskini, 319 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2003).
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2. A "Soft Core" of Terrorist Conduct
Aside from the hardcore cases, juries try and convict a second group of ter-
rorist defendants whose conduct has less directly threatened U.S. interests, but
the prosecution of whom remains an important-and ongoing-part of the ex-
ecutive's war strategy of aggressive, preventative prosecution. These offenders in-
clude service providers, financiers, and sting participants. Overall, their cases il-
lustrate how broad the range of terrorism offense conduct is.
a. Terrorist "Service Providers"
Section 2339A has particularly broad reach over the "service providers" to
terrorists. The statute explicitly states that a defendant can be prosecuted for
providing himself as personnel, 240 or for providing services, training, or expert
advice to a terrorist or a terrorist organization.2 41 "[F]ollow[ing] the lead of the
statutory definition," courts have broadly construed the definition of providing
these services. 242
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project is the seminal case on terrorist service
provision. 43 In that case, the plaintiffs wanted to support the lawful activities of
two FTOs, the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) (which sought self-determination
for Turkish Kurds), and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (which
sought self-determination for the Tamil residents in Sri Lanka). Specifically, the
plaintiffs wanted to work with the PKK to "provide training in the use of human-
itarian and international law for the peaceful resolution of disputes, engage in
political advocacy on behalf of the Kurds living in Turkey, and teach the PKK
how to petition for relief before representative bodies like the United Nations." 44
For the LTTE, plaintiffs wanted to "provide training in the presentation of claims
to mediators and international bodies for tsunami-related aid, offer legal exper-
tise in negotiating peace agreements between LTTE and the Sri Lankan govern-
ment, and engage in political advocacy on behalf of Tamils living in Sri Lanka." 245
Fearing criminal prosecution for these activities, plaintiffs sought an injunc-
tion against enforcement of sections 2339A and 2339B. The district court granted
a partial injunction in 1998.246 After a sequence of appeal, remand, and congres-
sional amendment, the case was consolidated and decided in the Central District
240. See, e.g., United States v. Abdi, 498 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1054, 1058 (S.D. Ohio 2007).
241. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1)-(3) (2012).
242. ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 122, at 32.
243. 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
244. Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1136-37 (C.D. Cal.
2005), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705.
245. Id.
246. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
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of California in 2005, and then affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in 2009.247 The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari on, among other issues, the question of whether
the terms "training," "expert advice or assistance," "service," and "personnel"
were void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
as applied to plaintiffs' activities.248 The Court held that
[m]ost of the activities in which plaintiffs seek to engage readily fall
within the scope of the terms "training" and "expert advice or assis-
tance." . . . A person of ordinary intelligence would understand that in-
struction on resolving disputes through international law falls within the
statute's definition of "training" because it imparts a "specific skill," not
"general knowledge." § 2339A(b)(2). Plaintiffs' activities also fall com-
fortably within the scope of "expert advice or assistance": A reasonable
person would recognize that teaching the PKK how to petition for hu-
manitarian relief before the United Nations involves advice derived
from, as the statute puts it, "specialized knowledge." § 2339A(b)(3).249
With respect to the term "service," the Court held that it covered "advocacy per-
formed in coordination with, or at the direction of, a foreign terrorist organiza-
tion."250 It did not elaborate further on "how much direction or coordination is
necessary for an activity to constitute a 'service,' 25 leaving the lower courts free
to continue to develop their own standards.
As developed, those standards have been expansive. They have, for instance,
captured most medical-related services. 2 2 Although section 2339A excepts medi-
cine and religious materials, that exception does not extend to medical supplies
or medical personnel.25 3 In United States v. Shah, for example, the defendant doc-
tor was prosecuted under sections 2339A and 2339B for providing medicine to
wounded jihadists.2 5 4 As the prosecution alleged, the doctor had basically "vol-
unteered as a medic for the al Qaeda military."255 In the court's view, "[m]uch as
a military force needs weapons, ammunition, trucks, food, and shelter, it needs
247. Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 933 (9th Cir. 2009).
248. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2716.
249. Id. at 2720.
250. Id. at 2722.
251. Id.
252. The law defining the boundaries of acceptable service provision in the War on Ter-
ror is in need of clarification. Under the Geneva Conventions, for example, a doctor
who was not fighting cannot be captured on the battlefield. Geneva I, supra note 33,
art. 24. One D.C. Circuit case, meanwhile, held that the AUMF is not limited by
international law and that a Taliban cook could thus be lawfully detained. Al-Bihani
v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
253. H.R. REP. No. 104-518, tit. 3, at 114 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
254. 474 F. Supp. 2d 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
255. Id. at 498-99.
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medical personnel to tend to its wounded."256 The doctor, "who never actually
succeeded in providing medical services to al Qaeda," was convicted of the ma-
terial support charges.f' He was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. 15
Similarly, in United States v. Warsame, the defendant was prosecuted under
section 2339B for providing English lessons in an al Qaeda clinic in Afghanistan
in order to aid nurses' reading of English medicine labels.' 9 The prosecution al-
leged that these nurses treated al Qaeda members in nearby terrorist camps.
Therefore, the court reasoned, the English-language training had "direct applica-
tion to an FTO's terrorist activities, as it would likely speed the healing and even-
tual return of terrorist militants to Al Qaeda training camps."26 0 Moreover, be-
cause the training was "in close proximity to terrorist training camps," the
"alleged conduct [was] closely tied to terrorist activity, such that Warsame would
likely understand his conduct to be criminalized as 'training' under 2339B." 2 6 1
After applying the Sentencing Guidelines and the Terrorism Enhancement,
the court arrived at a sentencing range of 292 to 365 months. Interestingly, how-
ever, because the court also found "nothing that adequately demonstrates that
Warsame was part of a specific plot against the United States, and very little that
suggests he was especially useful to al Qaeda," it exercised its discretion to vary
downward, based on the factors enumerated in i8 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and imposed
a sentence of ninety-two months imprisonment. 6
These cases, though only a small sample, illustrate the breadth of the court's
power to characterize the provision of service, define its relationship to terrorism,
and then impose a sentence based on its assessment of the national security threat
that service presents. Yet that reasoning is not always made explicit, making it
hard to know what informed the court's analysis in these respects. These deci-
sions should be principled, and driven by a reasoned assessment of why the sen-
tence is both necessary and proportional, and sufficient to prevent the defendant,
and others like him, from performing such services in the future.
b. Low-Level Financiers
256. Id. at 499.
257. ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 122; see also Gov't Memorandum in Opposition to
Rafiq Sabir's First Motion To Set Aside Verdict, at 21-23, United States v. Shah, No.
05-cr-673 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2007), Dkt. No 163 (discussing factual circumstances
of Sabir's involvement in the conspiracy and his attempt to provide material sup-
port).
258. Judgment, United States v. Shah, No. 05-cr-oo673 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2007), Dkt.
No. 176.
259. 537 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (D. Minn. 2008).
260. Id. at 1019.
261. Id.
262. United States v. Warsame, 651 F. Supp. 2d 978, 981 (D. Minn. 2009).
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Congress has appropriately recognized that funding terrorism is as serious a
threat to national security as the perpetration of terrorist acts. Congress thus
drafted the material support statutes to criminalize funding terrorist activity. In
fact, Congress was so concerned with the problem of funding that it enacted sec-
tion 2339B in part to close the loopholes through which a would-be terrorist sup-
porter could fund terrorism under the guise of a humanitarian or a charitable
donation.2 63 Given that congressional concern, courts are right to view terrorism
financing seriously-even among the softcore offenses.
Even so, not every financial supporter of terrorism should be punished as a
hardcore offender, particularly where the financing is minimal, attenuated to ter-
rorism, or plainly not motivated by any anti-American ideology. The need to dis-
tinguish some of these financing cases is apparent in the case law. The case of
United States v. Issa is just one example.264 There, the three defendants, Oumar
Issa, Harouna Toure, and Idriss Abdelrahman, were apprehended in Ghana and
charged with a conspiracy to transport drugs across Africa and into Spain, using
the assistance of al Qaeda handlers along the route.26 5 According to the indict-
ment, the proceeds of the drug sales were earmarked for the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), a group classified as an FTO since 1997.6
Though the quantity of drugs that the defendants were planning to ship was sub-
stantial-500-1,000 kilograms2 -the defendants' actual involvement was not.
Issa "admitted in part that he had agreed with others to assist in the transfer of
drugs on behalf of FARC,"268 whom the government argued he knew to be mem-
bers of FARC.2 69 He was alleged to have collaborated with Toure, who was
charged with agreeing to help FARC members transport the drugs by procuring
a truck and making some other basic preparations for leaving the country with
the drugs.270 Toure, in turn, was charged with coordinating with Abdelrahman
263. See supra notes 123-127 and accompanying text.
264. No. og-cr-1244 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
265. Indictment ii, Issa, No. o9-cr-1244 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2009), Dkt. No. 12.
266. Id.
267. Id. 1n1e.
268. Gov't Memorandum in Support of Sentencing at 6, Issa, No. o9-cr-1244 (S.D.N.Y.
March 6, 2012), Dkt. No. 102.
269. Id. at io. This case was part of a sting operation by the Drug Enforcement Agency.
The "FARC members" were actually U.S. government confidential sources.
270. Indictment I 1c-e, Issa, No. 09-cr-1244 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2009), Dkt. No. 12.
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and Abdelrahman's militia contacts to ensure the drugs' passage through the de-
sert.' ' The three defendants were charged with material support under sec-
tion 2339B and the crime of narcoterrorism 27 All three pled guilty to the material
support count.73
That conduct is certainly reprehensible as an attempt and conspiracy to pro-
vide material support to an FTO, and should be punishable by the U.S. courts.
But from a blameworthiness perspective, it pales in comparison to hardcore ter-
rorist financiers, like the defendant in United States v. Bagcho. Bagcho "was one
of the largest heroin traffickers in the world[, who] ... sent heroin to more than
20 countries, including the United States, [and whose drug] [p]roceeds . . .
were . . . used to support high-level members of the Taliban to further their in-
surgency in Afghanistan."' 74 It is difficult to dispute that the Issa defendants' con-
duct posed a lesser threat to the United States' security than did Bagcho's. More-
over, the fact that the Issa defendants were financially, rather than ideologically
motivated further suggests that they deserved different treatment at sentencing.2 71
In recognition of these differences in offense and offender characteristics, a re-
vised War on Terror sentencing guidelines framework should provide courts
with instructions and criteria for distinguishing among defendants like Issa and
Bagcho.
c. Sting Operations and Government Informants
Sting operations capture terrorist defendants who also sometimes merit dis-
tinction. In recent years, the government has increasingly used sting operations
to preventively prosecute terrorism. 6 By the nature of a sting operation, it tends
to target conduct that is more removed from a putative terrorist act-both tem-
271. Id. ne.
272. 21 U.S.C. § 960a (2012).
273. Order Accepting Plea, Issa, No. o9-cr-1244 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012), Dkt. No. 9o;
Minute Entry Accepting Pleas of Defendant Toure and Defendant Abdelrahman,
Issa, No. o9-cr-1244 (S.D.N.Y. April 26, 2012).
274. Press Release, Dep't of Justice (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.justice.gov
/opa/pr/2012/March/12-crm-320.html; see Lily Kuo, Heroin Trafficker with Ties to
Taliban Gets Life in U.S. Prison, NBC NEWS, June 12, 2012, http://www.msnbc
.msn.com/id/4779059o/ns/world newssouth and central asia/t/heroin-trafficker
-ties-taliban-gets-life-us-prison/#.T-3Y5FLsZzo.
275. See Benjamin Weiser, Citing Terror Defendants' Motivation, Judge Shows Sentencing
Leniency, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/23
/nyregion/judges -ruling- in -qaeda-terror- case- openideologydebate.html.
276. See TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD, supra note 3, at 4 ("The rise in indictments
[since 2009] is significantly affected by FBI informant operations. Since 2009,
nearly 50% of terrorism cases have involved informants. . . . At least 15% of those
informant cases can be considered sting operations.").
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porally and substantively, and therefore sweeps in a wide range of offense con-
duct. The prevalence of sting operations again confirms the need for a revised,
more nuanced sentencing framework for War on Terror cases.
Importantly, sting operations capture individuals who are susceptible to ter-
rorist recruitment, but who have yet to commit an actual terrorist offense. Like
the financiers, the sting cases also show a divide between the politically motivated
defendant and, more innocuously, the very weak-willed one. The case of United
States v. Mandhai is illustrative.'77 There, the defendant met an undercover FBI
operative, Howard Gilbert, who was posing as a disgruntled Marine who had
converted to Islam and wanted to wage jihad against the United States. Gilbert
suggested to Mandhai that they should harm the United States by bombing elec-
trical substations. The defendant was then introduced to another FBI operative,
who was posing as someone with ties to bin Laden. Mandhai was charged with
conspiring to damage and destroy electrical power stations and a National Guard
armory by means of fire and explosives, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)(n), and
with inducing another individual, Shueyb Mossa Jokhan, to damage the property
of an energy facility, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1366. He pled guilty to the first
count. 7
At sentencing, the court applied the Terrorism Enhancement as well as a
"Role Enhancement" under section 3B1.1(c) of the Sentencing Guidelines. 79 In-
terestingly, the court also gave Mandhai a three-level downward departure on the
ground that his crime was inchoate and that, but for Terrorism Enhancement, he
would have benefited from a reduction under the guidelines for that reason.280
The court then imposed 140 months imprisonment, which was at the low end of
the adjusted guidelines' range.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the sentence. It noted that Congress intended
to punish inchoate crimes of terrorism, and therefore the district court's basis for
departure was impermissible. The court of appeals agreed, however, that the
twelve-level increase required by the Terrorism Enhancement seemed, in Man-
dhai's case, to "prevent[] the penalty from fitting the crime," especially in view
of the fact that the "main engine driving the conspiracy was [an FBI coopera-
tor]-who was not charged" and that "every time Mandhai, the only teenager
involved, had second thoughts" the two FBI informants "kept the conspiracy on
track. "282
Undoubtedly, defendants prosecuted for attempted acts of terrorism, even if
conscripted by a government agent, should be punished consistent with the war
277. 375 F.3d 1243 (iith Cir. 2004).
278. Id. at 1246-47.
279. For a discussion of role enhancements under the Sentencing Guidelines, see Aggra-
vating and Mitigating Role Adjustments Primer §§ 3B.1 & 3B.2, supra note 226.
280. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2XI.1(b)(2) (2007).
281. Mandhai, 375 F.3d at 1247.
282. Id. at 1249-50.
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aim of aggressive prevention. But in fashioning a sentence that is proportionate
to the threat, it seems hard to dispute that the defendant's knowledge, as well as
his intent and capability of committing the crime, is relevant to the punishment
he deserves.
Overall, these cases involving service providers, financiers, and sting partici-
pants suggest the courts' inability to distinguish among terrorism offenders at the
punishment phase of the case. This failure, it seems, is largely attributable to the
inflexible and underinclusive sentencing framework that guides them. As this
Part has argued, applying a law-of-war lens to sentencing is the first step toward
developing a more sophisticated and effective body of law to govern the civilian
courts' punishments in the War on Terror. Part III takes that step, and recom-
mends a way to revise the Sentencing Guidelines for specific application to the
context of conflict.
III. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR PUNISHMENT IN THE WAR ON TERROR
Part III moves from theory to application. It suggests a way to use the nor-
mative framework constructed in Part II as a basis for revising the Sentencing
Guidelines that apply to War on Terror cases. To that end, this Part suggests an
overhaul of the current standard for applying the Terrorism Enhancement, which
questions whether a defendant has "calculated" his conduct toward terroristic
ends, for a more refined (and yet simplified) analysis that considers a defendant's
"substantial steps" toward the terrorism offense and the motives for his conduct.
The ultimate goal of the revision is for civilian courts to gain the sentencing tools
they need to distinguish between the hardcore and softcore offenders, and among
the softcore offenders. Part III concludes with an argument as to why the revised
guidelines proposed are not only more legitimate, but also serve to further na-
tional security and America's long-term interests.
A. A Two-Part "Mens Rea" Inquiry Adapted to the War on Terror
This Section proposes a guidelines system that replaces the Terrorism En-
hancement with a multifactored (fact-bound) intent analysis. With this change,
courts would no longer be challenged to determine whether a terrorist defend-
ant's actions were "calculated" to influence government, and instead would have
at their disposal more concrete tools to punish defendants relative to their culpa-
bility and threat to the national security.
1. Problems with the "Calculated" Standard
The elements required for conviction of a federal crime of terrorism are,
technically, different from those required for application of the Terrorism En-
hancement. But in practice, the distinction has proven elusive. Questions sur-
rounding the varying requirements have arisen with some regularity, particularly
with respect to the mens rea requirement for application of the Terrorism En-
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hancement. That confusion is certainly a cause for concern. In the context of ter-
rorism, the defendant's mens rea is critical, as it indicates his propensity to recid-
ivate, and suggests the level of security risk that he poses. Without a clear way to
determine mens rea, it seems impossible for courts to impose a sentence that is
reasonable, necessary, and effective.
The source of the confusion, it seems, is the "calculated" standard, that is,
whether "the offense was calculated to influence or affect the conduct of govern-
ment" sufficient to trigger the Terrorism Enhancement. 8 3 Its application is, in-
deed, perplexing. Consider, for instance, the sentencing of a defendant convicted
of material support under section 2339B. Pursuant to that statute, the govern-
ment need only prove the defendant's "guilty knowledge, but not [his] guilty in-
tent" to secure a conviction.284 With respect to section 2339A, the statute requires
that the defendant knew or intended his support to be used in preparation for or
carrying out terrorist activity.28 And so while it would seem that calculation is
something more than mere knowledge, what calculated conduct amounts to as a
factual matter remains unclear.
A few courts of appeals, including the Second and the Fourth Circuits (where
a significant number of terrorism cases are prosecuted), have tried to provide
some clarification on that question, 86 but without much success. The Second
Circuit grappled with it relatively recently in the War on Terror in United States
v. Stewart. " Stewart involved the conduct of a lawyer, Lynn Stewart, her student-
translator, Mohammed Yousry, and her terrorist-client, Abdel Rahman, who was
a spiritual leader for the terrorist group al-Gama. The defendants were charged
with violating the prison's Special Administrative Measures (SAMs), which had
restricted Rahman's ability to communicate with individuals outside the prison.
It was the government's theory that Stewart provided material support to al-
Gama by providing "communications equipment" and "personnel" by publicly
relaying Rahman's messages regarding a ceasefire.2' A jury convicted Stewart and
Yousry on the section 2339A count.3 9
Without elaborating, the Second Circuit concluded that the Terrorism En-
hancement requires a finding of specific intent.290 It thus affirmed the district
283. See 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2012). U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
3A1.4(a) & app. n.4 (2012).
284. Pendle, supra note 127, at 803; see also Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.
Ct. 2705, 2717 (2010) (confirming that specific intent of furthering a special plot or
the FTO's goals is not required for conviction).
285. ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 122, at 33.
286. See United States v. Assi, 428 Fed. App'x 570 (6th Cir. 2011).
287. 590 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2009).
288. Id. at 114-16.
289. Id. at io8.
290. Id. at 138.
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court's decision not to apply the Terrorism Enhancement to Yousry because it
agreed that the "involved" prong of the enhancement had not been triggered as
there was no evidence that Yousry himself had sought to influence or affect the
conduct of the government.9' Later cases in the Second Circuit have developed
the standard some, but not much. At best, the Second Circuit instructs the district
courts to interpret "calculated" as "intentional."' 9'
The Fourth Circuit has also attempted to provide "guidance on what sort of
intent justifies th[e] [terrorism] enhancement for a material support crime." 293
In United States v. Hammoud, the Fourth Circuit provided some examples where
an enhanced sentence would be appropriate, including "where [a] defendant had
close connections with Hizballah officials and his own testimony indicated that
he was well aware of Hizballah's terrorist activities and goals and that he person-
ally supported this aspect of Hizballah."294 As another example from a later case,
that court agreed that an enhanced sentence would be warranted where a "de-
fendant attended a jihadist training camp abroad, was acquainted with a network
of people involved in violent jihad and terrorism, and lied about both."2 95
But these examples are only partially helpful. Although they illustrate the
type of conduct that would arguably qualify as hardcore, these cases do not ad-
dress how the calculated standard might apply to distinguish among cases of
softcore offenders, which are undoubtedly encountered by the courts in that ju-
risdiction as well. And so it is not surprising that questions at the district court
level remain, and that Terrorism Enhancements are bootstrapped to most terror-
ism convictions.296 To avoid the morass, it seems, courts have simply defaulted
to application of the Terrorism Enhancement, and occasionally varied from the
sentence the enhancement produces.2 97 The source of the confusion-the "cal-
291. Id. at 137.
292. United States v. Awan, 607 F.3d 306, 317 (2d Cir. 2010).
293. United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 356 (4th Cir. 2004).
294. Id.
295. United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 313 (4th Cir. 2008).
296. See Harris, supra note 172 (noting that his review "shows that judges uphold the
government's request for an enhancement far more often than they deny it," and
that prosecutors "obtained the enhancement in 27 of the 35 cases" reviewed).
297. Admittedly, that state of affairs is no different from the method by which courts
ordinarily sentence in the typical criminal context. But, as this Article has endeav-
ored to make clear, the War on Terror context is unique and, in this special setting,
the standard sentencing method is troubling insofar as it produces sentences that
do not make sense in view of the actual offense conduct and do not advance the
government's overarching war aims. And so, in this context, there should be some
concrete parameters-beyond those expressed in section 3553(a)-to guide the
courts' exercise of discretion, to ensure that the appropriate purposes and legal
principles are respected so that punishments in this war more clearly fit the crimes
committed and further the United States' counterterrorism aims consistently
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culated" language-as written directly in the Sentencing Guidelines and incor-
porated by reference to section 2332b(g) (5), should be replaced with more man-
ageable doctrinal tools.
2. The "Substantial Step" Doctrine
The substantial step doctrine is a classic blackletter test of a criminal attempt,
which has developed in the common law and in the Model Penal Code. In its
simplest formulation, a substantial step is "[t]he minimum conduct . .. towards
the commission of the crime ... [which] must have been strongly corroborative
of the actor's purpose."9'* Although the substantial step doctrine is usually con-
sidered in connection with the actus reus rather than intent, here it functions well
as a replacement for the calculated standard, which, most precisely understood,
speaks to a terrorist defendant's actions as well as his intent.
Incorporating a substantial step-like doctrine into the Sentencing Guidelines
for terrorism is sensible for several reasons. For one, the defendant's proximity
to an actual terrorist plot indicates the seriousness of the threat he poses, and
thereby informs the necessity of deterring and/or incapacitating him with impris-
onment. Moreover, his proximity to a crime of terrorism speaks to the propor-
tionality of his sentence, as it places the defendant along a spectrum of culpability
relative to other defendants sentenced in the War on Terror cases. 99 The sub-
stantial step doctrine is also capacious enough to consider other factors relevant
to punishment, such as the degree of support provided and the defendant's role
in the terrorist offense.300 Both of those factors-degree and role-are important
in devising a more proportionate and reasonable sentencing system, but neither
are necessarily considered in connection with the Terrorism Enhancement.
Lastly, it bears emphasizing that the substantial step doctrine would be a partic-
ularly effective way to differentiate defendants' relative culpability in this context,
where offenses span a broad timeline.
Some cases will be clear-cut. In United States v. Harun, for example, the de-
fendant was indicted for conspiring to assist al Qaeda in connection with a plot
across all federal jurisdictions. Courts' skittishness in the area of national security
threats probably compounds their propensity to default to the enhancement. See
Burt Neuborne, Spheres ofJustice: Who Decides?, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1090, 1116
(2006) ("According to my research, Article III courts have never invalidated a na-
tional security initiative that was explicitly endorsed by both the President and
Congress.").
298. Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm Under the
Code, and in the Common Law, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 725, 729 (1988).
299. Outside the national security context, Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit has dis-
cussed the substantial step doctrine in relation to the "psychology of intent": " [a]
person who demonstrates by his conduct that he has the intention and capability
of committing a crime is punishable even if his plan was thwarted." United States
v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir. 2008).
300. See McLoughlin, supra note 4, at loo.
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to "deliver, place, discharge and detonate ... explosives" in U.S. diplomatic and
consular facilities in Nigeria.30 ' He was charged with, among other crimes of ter-
rorism, violating sections 2339A and 2339B. Even on the sparse information avail-
able in the indictment, it seems relatively obvious that, if proven, substantial steps
were taken to execute this serious terrorist plot. A district court should be able to
reach that determination without wading into the greyness of the calculated
standard, which, even in a relatively clear case of hardcore conduct like this, could
invite a range of potentially confounding questions. As the case law develops the
substantial step standard in cases like Harun, it will become easier for other dis-
trict courts to meaningfully distinguish dissimilarly situated defendants, who are
indicted for crimes of terror but did not come nearly as close to providing sup-
port or assistance in connection with an identifiable terrorist plot to harm Amer-
ican lives or economic interests. In short, assessing the substance of the steps
taken toward a terrorist plot or in furtherance of a terrorist network's concrete
goals is a workable way for a court to assess a defendant's culpability and threat.
3. Ideological Motivation
Ideology is a second metric for gauging a terrorist defendant's culpability and
threat. Yet oddly, although a defendant's reasons for becoming involved in ter-
rorism seem obviously related to his ability to be deterred and the degree to which
he poses a threat to national security, motive is often considered irrelevant in the
Terrorism Enhancement analysis.
The oddity is well illustrated in the cases. In United States v. Awan, for in-
stance, the defendant was convicted of, among other things, providing material
support under section 2339A in connection with his help transferring money to
the Khalistan Commando Force, a group responsible for terrorism in India."o'
The district court did not apply the Terrorism Enhancement because it found
that there was "no proof that the defendant was motivated by a desire to influence
Indian government or retaliate against the Indian government[,]" but rather, had
"private purposes in mind."30 3 However, the Second Circuit vacated the sentence
for procedural error: namely, that the Terrorism Enhancement does not require
proof that a defendant was motivated to influence or affect the conduct of a gov-
ernment, only that he "calculated" his actions to that end.30 4 In other words, the
government only needs to prove the defendant "engaged in conduct in order to
bring about a result," not that he was motivated by any particular reason to bring
301. Indictment !! 2-5, United States v. Harun, No. 12-cr-134 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2012),
Dkt. No. 1.
302. 607 F.3d 306 (2d Cir. 2010).
303. Id. at 316.
304. Id. at 317.
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about that result.30 5 This distinction is confusing. But it seems to mean that, for
sentencing purposes, it does not matter why a defendant became involved with
terrorism, only that the defendant intended to take the actions that he did.30 6
Ignoring motive in these cases leads to bizarre results, as noted by at least one
court. In this regard, the Al-Arian court posed an interesting hypothetical:
A and B are members of a[n] FTO. The FTO exists to oppose and remove
(by violent and non-violent means) a foreign government. A opposes
the FTO's use of violent means to accomplish its goals. B has no problem
with the group's use of violence and wants to raise funds for weapons to
further that interest. B travels to where A lives to raise money. A does
not know that B is coming to fundraise on behalf of the FTO. A picks B
up at the airport. A allows B to stay in his home, use his telephone, and
use his house to entertain other FTO members while A is at work. B
fundraises while A is gone.30
A can likely be convicted for his involvement with a crime of terror (because he
knowingly sheltered B, whom he knew to be a member of an FTO), but given his
opposition to violence and lack of any discernable commitment to the terrorist
group, to punish A equally with B is neither proportional to his crime nor neces-
sary to contain the threat he poses.308
Aside from the normative and policy reasons for distinguishing these offend-
ers discussed in Part II, there are other compelling reasons to account for a de-
fendant's motive at the punishment phase. One such reason is grounded in his-
tory, and the tradition of calibrating the punishment of political criminals to their
political motivation. Treason law-a precursor to modern terrorism law-is a
prime example.30 9 Much like the terrorism laws, treason laws are directed at sub-
jective feelings of disloyalty and betrayal. As Professor George Fletcher has writ-
ten, "the crime is addressed to the bond of loyalty between a particular sovereign
and subordinate subjects" and has at its "core" "internal attitudes," namely the
"mental actions of compassing or lusting in one's heart."31 0 The first trials for war
305. Transcript of Sentencing as to Defendant Toure at 12-13, United States v. Issa, No.
o9-cr-1244 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2012), Dkt. No. 137 (offering the government's expla-
nation of "calculated" behavior).
306. As the Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Issa case argued, "There is no requirement that
a defendant who is providing material support to a terrorist organization be driven
by ideology . . .. The point is that he provided support knowing that it was a ter-
rorist organization, knowing that it had an anti-U.S. agenda." Weiser, supra note
275.
307. United States v. Al-Arian, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (emphasis
added).
308. See supra Section IJ.B.
309. See ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 122, at 45 ("Treason is the oldest crime available
for terrorism prosecutions.").
310. George P. Fletcher, Law, Loyalty, and Treason: How Can the Law Regulate Loyalty
Without Imperiling It?: Ambivalence About Treason, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1611, 1621
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crimes were to the same effect: at Nuremburg, for example, " [a] number of tri-
bunals rewarded defendants for maintaining professional and ideological inde-
pendence from the Nazis.""'
There are also symbolic reasons to make distinctions at sentencing based on
the defendant's motives. And symbolism has played a prominent role in the gov-
ernment's efforts to wage the War on Terror." The Bush Administration, for
instance, repeatedly characterized the conflict as one against "'evil' forces."313 As
Eichensehr points out, " [I] n the wake of 9/n the Bush Administration framed the
'War on Terrorism' as an existential struggle. A struggle that is perceived as exis-
tential-the forces of good battling to survive against the forces of evil-is laden
with symbolism." 314
Related, there is good public policy reason to punish ideologically motivated
terrorism more severely than the same conduct that lacks ideological motives. As
an expressive matter, that distinction would send signals to the enemy regarding
the legitimacy of terrorist conduct in general-namely, a more forceful message
that the jihadist mission will be singled out for particular punishment in the
American criminal justice system. 31 5 A symbolic message against ideology is also
important to winning the "hearts and minds" and sustaining domestic support
for this protracted conflict with terrorism: for better or worse, "[i]f the country
(2004). The treason analogy is relevant to the crimes of international terrorists, as
"[t]he current U.S. understanding of treason" includes not only U.S. citizens but
also those present in the United States. Eichensehr, supra note ni, at 1466.
Eichensehr argues, however, that the American instantiation of treason laws, as de-
veloped by the Framers and interpreted by the Supreme Court, limits the crime to
external acts. Id. at 1468-70.
311. HELLER, supra note 32, at 324.
312. See Eichensehr, supra note 11, at 1482 (noting that U.S. government leaders "have
framed the conflict with Al Qaeda" in "symbolic terms").
313. Id. (referring to, among other sources, Peter Baker, President Who Sees in Absolutes
Awaits Voters' Definitive Answer, WASH. PosT, Nov. 7, 2006, at Aoi (noting that
President Bush's world "is a world of absolutes" and quoting him as saying, in ref-
erence to the War on Terror, "I view this as a struggle of good versus evil"); and
George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), http://tran-
scripts.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/o1/29/bush.speech.txt).
314. Eichensehr, supra note ii, at 1482-83.
315. The relationship between punishment, motivation, and legitimacy was recognized
by the Special Court for Sierra Leone in the Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa case.
Sentencing Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T (Oct. 9, 2007). There, the Appeals
Chamber reversed a sentence of the Trial Chamber that had mitigated the sentence
based on the defendant's political motives, on the ground that doing so would con-
fer legitimacy to conduct that unequivocally violated the law. See Robert D. Sloane,
The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in
the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT L L. 46, 48-49 (2009).
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perceives itself to be fighting an existential conflict either for its survival or against
an 'evil' enemy, then symbolism becomes very important."316
For all of these reasons, a revised terrorism sentencing guidelines should in-
struct the courts at sentencing to more deeply probe the defendant's ideological
motivations, just as it should instruct courts to consider the defendant's substan-
tial steps, degree of involvement, and role in the offense.
B. Translating These Criteria into Guidelines for Punishment
This Section gathers these doctrinal suggestions into a model Sentencing
Guideline to replace the Terrorism Enhancement.317 It proposes disposing of the
Terrorism Enhancement in favor of new War on Terror sentencing guidelines,
which include amended base-offense levels that correspond to the hardcore and
softcore groups of offenders, and which also distinguish among the defendants
in the softcore group. The guidelines proposed recommend one track for pun-
ishment of hardcore offenders and a second for punishment of softcore offend-
ers.
1. Track One for Hardcore Offenders
Subsection II.C.1 discussed the cases of hardcore terrorism. Those defend-
ants, and others like them, have the specific intent to perpetrate a specific terrorist
act or organizational goal (or have already done so); are ideologically motivated
(by anti-American animus); and were involved in a plot or organization in a sub-
stantial way. For this category of offenders, specific deterrence is unlikely and the
overriding goal is incapacitation-that is, preventing them from recidivating to
the battlefield of terrorism.
It is axiomatic under the law of war that a government may detain its enemy
combatants for the duration of hostilities."' Consistent with that principle, re-
gardless whether these defendants are criminally tried in civilian courts, the ex-
ecutive has authority to detain them for the duration of the War on Terror.319 As
the civilian courts act as partners with the executive in advancing the global War
on Terror, these courts should be cognizant of that detaining prerogative and
316. Eichensehr, supra note 11, at 1485.
317. While the courts' relatively unfettered discretion is fine in the ordinary criminal
context, where the courts have ample experience and precedent, in the context of
sentencing fighter- criminals who partake in a global war, it is worth questioning
whether additional guidance is required.
318. See Chesney, supra note 77, at 3.
319. See Hamdan v. United States, 696 F. 3d 1238, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (noting that "the
United States may have continued to detain Hamdan until the end of hostilities
pursuant to its wartime detention authority").
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power, and be guided to impose analogous restrictions on liberty where the hard-
core defendants are concerned.
But such guidance is not explicit in the current law. Neither the Sentencing
Guidelines nor the terrorism statutes employ military-necessity reasoning in set-
ting out the maximum or minimum penalties proscribed for crimes of interna-
tional terrorism. Some of the federal terrorism statutes provide for maximum
terms of life in prison, but again, only in limited circumstances, such as where a
death results. Otherwise, the maximum terms of imprisonments are less-the
material support statutes, for instance, carry only fifteen-year maximums.32 0 As
far as thresholds are concerned, with the exception of the narcoterrorism statute,
most of the terrorism statutes do not provide for mandatory minimum sen-
tences, and even narcoterrorism carries only a ten-year mandatory minimum.32 1
The terrorism statutes thus give the courts considerable latitude to sentence hard-
core offenders to sentences less than the duration of hostilities, for sure. Given
the importance of incapacitation here, that flexibility is unwise.
The surest solution lies with Congress, which should consider amending the
material support statutes to provide for sentences that correspond to the dura-
tion of the conflict, rather than a definite term of years. Given that the conflict is
indefinite, the maximums could arguably be increased to life. Such amendments
would be well justified by reference to military practice and the laws and customs
of war, which confirm the necessity of detaining an enemy for the duration of a
conflict.2 With that amendment to the statutory maximum sentences, the base-
offense levels for hardcore offenders could likewise increase to 43 (life). Courts
would then be able to impose sentences that match the statutory life maximum,
with the possibility of an early release pending some form of conduct-review,
should the conflict with terrorism end.3 23
2. Track Two for Softcore Offenders
Under a new set of guidelines, a completely different set of rules would gov-
ern the sentencing of softcore defendants. The mechanics of those guidelines
would be simple. First, at the preliminary sentencing hearing, the court deter-
mines whether the defendant is on track one or track two based on findings of
fact pertaining to the substantial step and ideology questions. If placed on track
two, a second, more intricate and fact-intensive hearing will be required to de-
termine the precise punishment to be imposed.
In the second hearing, the court begins, as usual, by calculating a base-of-
fense level. But arriving at the proper base-offense level would require a more
320. See supra notes 159-171 and accompanying text.
321. 18 U.S.C. § 96oa (2012).
322. See supra notes 318-319 and accompanying text.
323. See infra notes 361-363 (discussing use of parole review boards in national security
cases).
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factually rigorous proceeding than before. It would depend on the proof of sub-
stantial steps (with the government adducing facts suggesting how close a de-
fendant came to the crime, how involved, and in what capacity) and the nature
of the defendant's motivation. The base-offense levels would be gradated accord-
ing to the presence or absence of these facts. For instance, where a substantial
step and ideological motivation are found lacking, a proper base-offense level
might be 23, which yields a sentence of 46-57 months imprisonment.32 4 If, on the
other end of the spectrum, a defendant was ideologically motivated and had par-
ticipated in a substantial fashion, his base-offense level would be 27, yielding a
term of imprisonment of 70-87 months.12 5 Some levels between 23 and 27 should
also be included to address defendants that fall between those two factual ends.326
3. Sentencing Under a Revised Guidelines System
Three examples drawn from the case law again help to illustrate how these
new guidelines might operate in practice. The first is the case of United States v.
Issa, which involved three defendants, Oumar Issa, Harouna Toure, and Idriss
Abdelrahman, who were charged with narcoterrorism conspiracy under 21 U.S.C.
§ 960a and conspiracy to provide material support to the FARC. 32 7 Issa, who lived
in Mali, was approached by a government undercover agent and a cooperating
source regarding the possibility of transporting drugs from Ghana to Spain for
the FARC.32 The defendants, including Issa, were offered large sums of money
to help provide secure passage of the cocaine to Spain. 29 With respect to Issa's
mens rea, defense counsel argued at sentencing that there were no facts suggest-
ing that he knew that any of the drug proceeds would go to an anti-American
cause.330 Rather, the defense stated that Issa had never heard of the FARC before
meeting the government agents, and that all of his knowledge about the organi-
zation came from what those agents had told him.331 As to his motivation, the
defense argued in its sentencing memorandum that Issa's crime was financially
324. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, Sent'g Tbl. (2012).
325. Id.
326. This granular base-offense level schema would not apply to the hardcore defend-
ants, who are routed into track one during the initial sentencing hearing.
327. Indictment, United States v. Issa, No. o9-cr-1244 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2009), Dkt. No.
12.
328. Id. 111.
329. Memorandum in Opposition to Motion To Dismiss at 3-4, Issa, No. o9-cr-1244
(S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 17, 2012), Dkt. No. 98.
330. Transcript of Sentencing at 23, Issa, No. o9-cr-1244 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12. 2012).
331. Id. at 18-19.
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motivated; it highlighted the poverty in which he and his family had lived in
Mali.33'
Despite these factors, there were enough facts in the record for the court to
conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that Issa's conduct was calculated
to influence the American government.333 Based on certain tape-recorded con-
versations, the facts demonstrated that Issa knew he was working with FARC,
who had a "common enemy, the Americans," and that FARC is involved in kid-
nappings, and a "militia with warriors."33 4 After applying the Terrorism Enhance-
ment, the court exercised its discretion to vary below the Sentencing Guidelines,
pursuant to its authority under section 3553(a), from the i8o-month sentence that
the Sentencing Guidelines recommended. The court reasoned that Issa "had no
actual involvement in any activities of FARC"; that his "knowledge of FARC
[was] based on what informants told him"; that he was "not told of specific de-
tailed terrorist acts or plots"; and that he seemed to be the "least culpable member
of the conspiracy" insofar as "he introduced the informant and the source to his
co-defendant, Toure, but did nothing else to further the objective of helping the
transport of drugs or to help the objective of getting any weapons."33 5 Addition-
ally, the court found it "[p] retty clear that the defendant's motivation in this case
was money and not to influence the government, for political reasons," and that
"the defendant was not ideologically motivated."3 6 For those reasons, the court
found that Issa was a "defendant [who] can be deterred more easily than the ide-
ologically motivated."337 The court imposed a sentence of fifty-seven months im-
prisonment.338
Demonstrating its thoughtfulness, the court appropriately distinguished the
sentence imposed on Issa's co-defendant, Toure. When sentencing Toure, the
court determined that, in contrast to Issa, Toure understood that "the [terrorist]
groups that he was going to work with to transport drugs [had] anti-American
goals ... and that it should have been obvious that [] transporting the drugs ...
would only further their cause in fighting against America and the Americans." 339
332. Sentencing Mem. in Support of Defendant Issa at 6-7, Issa, No. og-cr-1244
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2012) (on file with court); Transcript of Sentencing at 35, Issa,
No. o-cr-1244 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12. 2012).
333. Though the court did not use the "calculated" language in its decision on the rec-
ord, it did so implicitly in applying the enhancement. See Transcript of Sentencing
at 26, Issa, No. og-cr-1244 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2012).
334. Id. at 24-27.
335. Id. at 49-52.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 51-52
338. Id. at 55.
339. Transcript of Sentencing as to Defendant Toure at 20, Issa, No. o9-cr-1244
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2012), Dkt. No. 137.
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Largely for that reason, Toure received a sentence of sixty-three months impris-
onment, notably longer than that imposed on his co-defendant Issa.340
These sentences are unique in the case law. The court in the Issa cases con-
sidered the relative culpability of the codefendants as well as their culpability rel-
ative to other offenders in other War on Terror cases.341 As such, Issa is a model
example of how a revised guideline that incorporates the substantial- step and
ideology criteria could be used to order defendants in the softcore category, ac-
cording to the seriousness of their conduct and threat to national security. In
short, a revised set of War on Terror guidelines would make explicit the type of
discretionary reasoning employed by the Issa court.
The case United States v. al Kassaf3 42 is a counterpoint to Issa, and its lack of
discretionary reasoning confirms why revised guidelines are much needed. In
that case, three foreign nationals were charged with, among other things, material
support under section 2339B. 3 4 3 Monzer al Kassar was a large-scale weapons
dealer; the other defendants were Tareq Mousa al-Ghazi, a middleman, and
Moreno Godoy, al Kassar's friend and assistant. According to the indictment,
some of the organizations to which al Kassar provided weapons were terrorist
groups, such as the Palestinian Liberation Front (part of whose mission was to
harm U.S. interests). 344 After conviction, al Kassar and Godoy were both given
identical sentences, which included 18o months imprisonment on the material
support charge (to serve concurrently with the sentences imposed on the other
counts of conviction).345
Is that a reasonable, proportionate, and necessary result? The facts in the rec-
ord suggested that, unlike al Kassar, Godoy
came very late to th[e] conspiracy and played . . . a lesser role. He shut-
tled the informants to and from airports, train stations and hotels;
helped facilitate the transfer of funds . . ; and served as an intermediary
for messages between the informants and his friend and employer, Mon-
zer Al Kassar.346
340. Id. at 51. In Toure's case, the court applied the Terrorism Enhancement, but, finding
that Toure was not ideologically motivated and had taken steps to learn English in
prison (among other factors), the court departed downward to impose a prison
term of sixty-three months. Id. at 48-51.
341. See Weiser, supra note 275.
342. 582 F. Supp. 2d 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
343. Indictment 1 9, Al Kassar, 582 F. Supp. 2d 488 (No. 07-cr-354).
344. Id. I 1.
345. Judgment, Al Kassar, 582 F. Supp. 2d 488 (No. 07-cr-354), Dkt. No. ii9; Judgment,
Al Kassar, 582 F. Supp. 2d 488 (No. 07-cr-354) (Judgment as to Godoy, Dkt. No. 120.
346. Sentencing Memorandum in Support of Defendant Godoy at 7, Al Kassar, 582 F.
Supp. 2d 488 (No. 07-cr-354), Dkt. No. no.
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Despite that fact, the presentence report rejected a downward adjustment for Go-
doy's minimal participation.3 47
Also ignored was the fact that Godoy seemed to have been motivated by
money rather than animosity, unlike his co-defendant Kassar.348 For Godoy, who
was merely al Kassar's "friend and employee"-rather than his "business part-
ner"-" [h]is motivation [was] even further removed from 'terrorism.' 3 49 Godoy
had told the probation office
[t]o tell the truth I hate terrorists but the jury convicted me of terrorism.
I am a person of the right, I am very conservative. My family cannot
understand how come they accuse me of being a terrorist if I have my
ideology of the right and have been accused of helping a leftist terrorist
group.350
In contrast, for al Kassar, there was evidence of tape-recorded meetings at
which he mentioned liking the undercover agents' touted "cause against the
United States."351 Al Kassar also allegedly discussed FARC's need for missiles to
shoot down American helicopters in Colombia.352
In view of these facts, a proportionate sentence would have subjected Kassar
to a much more severe penalty than Godoy-not the same one-to reflect the
greater need to prevent al Kassar from supplying enemy groups in an ongoing
battle, as well as the aggravating circumstances of al Kassar's offense and in recog-
nition of the mitigating circumstances of Godoy's. Furthermore, sentencing al
Kassar to a term of life in prison while sentencing Godoy to a relatively shorter
prison term would have made a strong symbolic statement: that the United States
has zero tolerance for those committed to terrorism and who effectively further
it, but will treat fairly those who are incidental to these extremist groups and, if
properly incentivized, would choose a different path.
The defendant in United States v. Kahn, who has not yet been sentenced, is a
"candidate" for the application of a new sentencing guideline for international
terrorism. 5 There, the defendant pled guilty to an attempt to provide material
347. Id.
348. Id. at 4.
349. Id.
350. Id. (quoting the presentence report at 21, para. 84).
351. See Sentencing Memorandum in Support of Defendant al-Ghazi at 6, Al Kassar, 582
F. Supp. 2d 488 (No. 07-cr-354), Dkt. No. 134.
352. See id. at 7-8.
353. See Robert Chesney, NationalSecurityLaw United States v. Khan (N.D. Ill. June 8,
2012) (7.5 Year Sentence for Attempted Material Support to AQ in the Form ofMoney
Given to Ilyas Kahsmiri), J. OF NAT'L SEC'Y L. & POL'Y (June 8, 2012, 7:41 pm),
http://jnslp.wordpress.com/2012/06/08/nationalsecuritylaw-united-states-v-khan
-n -d- ill-june- 8 -2012- 7-5 -year- sentence- for- attempted-material- support-to -aq- in
-the -form- of -money- given -to -ilyas-kahsmiri (reporting the Department of
Justice press release on this case).
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support to an FTO. As generally described in the Department of Justice press
release, Kahn had met with a leader of the Kashmir independence movement,
whom Kahn knew or had reasons to know was working with al Qaeda in leading
attacks against the Indian government in the Kashmir region.354 Kahn gave this
terrorist leader, Ilyas Kashmiri, about $200 to $250, which he supposedly in-
tended Kashmiri to use for attacks in India.355 He later sent $930 to an individual
in Pakistan, with directions to give $300 of that sum to Kashmiri.356 Kahn then
met with an undercover law enforcement agent who was posing as someone in-
terested in sending money to Kashmiri for weapons and ammunition, and indi-
viduals to Pakistan for military-style training in connection with future attacks
against the United States.35 7 The agent expressed that he was interested in sup-
porting Kashmiri on the condition that he was working with al Qaeda.35 The
undercover agent provided Khan with $1,000, which Khan agreed to provide to
Kashmiri.35 9 Based on these factual snippets, it seems likely that the facts found at
a sentencing proceeding regarding Kahn's substantial steps would place him in
the second category of offenders, but at the highest range of base offender levels.
Although the DOJ did not believe "Khan ... posed any imminent domestic dan-
ger" 60 given his involvement in a sting, his financial contributions were not in-
substantial and his ideological commitment well demonstrated.
Most likely, institutional adjustments would have to be made to accommo-
date this new sentencing system. Rigorous prerelease review, for instance, would
be an important part of this revised guidelines system that yields a wider range of
sentences for terrorist offenders in the softcore group. It would also be important
to assess the continued threat to security, if any, posed by hardcore offenders
should the War on Terror officially cease and the justification for their life sen-
tences be undermined. The aim of a back-end prerelease review would be to en-
sure that defendants will not return to their previous terrorist affiliations or es-
calate their terrorist involvement upon their release and removal.
One possibility is a comprehensive parole-style review hearing before a na-
tional security review board, composed of a panel of national security experts,
much like the review boards that have been proposed by national security experts
354. Robert Chesney, NationalSecurityLaw United States v. Khan (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 2012)
(Guilty Plea in AQ Material Support Case), J. or NAT'L SEC'Y L. & POL'Y (Feb. 6,
2012, 10:46 pm), http://jnslp.wordpress.com/2012/o2/o6/nationalsecuritylaw-
united- states-v-khan- n -d- ill-feb- 6 -22- guilty-plea- in -aq- material- support- case
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as an alternative forum for trial.361 In some sense, the military commission system
already uses a version of review boards, the Annual Review Boards (ARBs), which
essentially provide parole hearings for each detainee. If the ARB determines that
the detainee is no longer a threat, that detainee may be released.362 In 2008, the
government spent over fifteen million dollars to hold ARBs for every detainee
and reviewed over 300,000 documents during those hearings.3 63 Resources and
precedent for such a procedural addition to the existing Article III system there-
fore already exist.
C. National Security Demands a Revised System for Punishment
Part II argued the current Sentencing Guidelines are inadequate to the War
on Terror cases for their failure to address directly how the principles of propor-
tionality, necessity, aggravation, and mitigation apply in this conflict context.
This Part suggested that a revised set of sentencing guidelines could better ac-
count for them, while serving deterrence and incapacitation objectives, by incor-
porating certain factual criteria for consideration-defendants' substantial steps
toward a terrorism offense as well as their degree of participation and role in the
terrorist scheme. This Section argues why such revisions to the Sentencing
Guidelines are as much an improvement in national security as sentencing policy.
For one, the revised sentencing guidelines address a serious national security
weakness in the current sentencing system, the risk that it is "hardening" terrorist
defendants against America, and contributing to the development or entrench-
ment of terrorist networks. The risk that terrorists will harden in the U.S. prison
system, or, in ordinary criminal language "recidivate," is at least in part a function
of their experience in prison, inclusive of their perceptions of the process behind
the punishment.
The correlation between prison and extremism is well documented, in both
theory and history. Several sociological explanations for criminal behavior relate
to prison, norm development, and group cohesion. 6 4 According to these expla-
nations, prisons provide environments in which criminal subcultures develop,36 5
361. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Op. Ed., The Terrorists' Court, N.Y. TIMES,
July n1, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/11/opinionilkatyal.html.
362. Kyndra Rotunda, Applying Geneva Convention Principles to Guantanamo Bay, 43 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1067, 1078-79 (2009).
363. Id. at 1079.
364. See, e.g., HOWARD ABADINSKY, ORGANIZED CRIME (2010).
365. See id. at 19-20 (noting that subcultures "are patterns of values, norms, and behav-
ior which have become traditional among certain groups . . . [or] occupants of
'closed institutions"' such as prisons).
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that is, groups that are oriented around "norms" and ideology.366 By that theory,
terrorist defendants' experience in prison shapes the norms or "frames of refer-
ence"36 7 that influence their " [i] deas about [American] society."368 Of course neg-
ative norms and ideologies will inevitably feed the growth of extremist networks,
both in prison and after a defendant's release.
There is other data to suggest that conditions of confinement can push to-
ward extremism those terrorist defendants that might have previously lacked very
radical beliefs.36 9 Intelligence experts, for one, have discussed the relationship be-
tween feelings of isolation and compelled betrayal that incarceration stimulates
and the hardening of radical ideals.370 Prison makes the possibility acute: "[it is
not particularly uncommon for terrorist groups to recruit some of their members
among criminal elements, particularly among individual who may have special
skills or common criminals who can contribute to its goals in instruments, train-
ing, and other matters."371
The origins of al Qaeda are a case in point. Although an extreme example,
prison played a role in hardening Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's second-in-
command and now, after bin Laden's death in June 2011, the putative al Qaeda
leader, against the West.37' Experts who have studied Zawahiri's case explain that
the time spent in Egyptian prisons "redoubled Zawahiri's [ideological] fervor.373
The combination of the mistreatment he experienced in prison and his engage-
ment with other radical militant thinkers,3 74 "transformed him from a relative
366. See id. at 20 (noting that " [s] ubculture theory explains criminal behavior as learned;
the subculturual delinquent has learned values that are deviant. Ideas about society
lead to criminal behavior").
367. Id.
368. Id. At one point, Department of Defense data suggested that five to ten percent of
detainees "rejoined the battle." Rotunda, supra note 362, at 1o8o.
369. See William Glaberson, Pentagon Study Sees Threat in Guantanamo Detainees, N.Y.
TIMES, July 26, 2007, at Ai6 (suggesting that experience at Guantanamo has made
certain detainees who were not otherwise that dangerous want to join forces with
al Qaeda).
370. Rotunda, supra note 362, at 1082-83; see ABADINSKY, supra note 365, at 5 (" [T] error-
ists imitate the organized criminal behavior they see around them, borrowing tech-
niques. This can lead to more intimate connections, particularly in places of poor
governance . . . such as in . .. prisons.").
371. ABADINSKY, supra note 365, at 5.
372. See, e.g., Jayshree Bajoria & Lee Hudson Teslik, Profile: Ayman al-Zawahiri, COUN-
CIL ON FOREIGN REL. (July 14, 2011), http://www.cfr.org/terrorist
-leaders/profile-ayman-al-zawahiri/p9750#p2.
373. Id.
374. Lawrence Wright, The Man Behind Bin Laden, NEW YORKER, Sept. 16, 2002, at 71.
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moderate in the Islamist underground into a violent extremist."3 75 By those his-
torical accounts, Zawahiri was released from the Cairo prison in 1984 "a hardened
radical." 76 While Zawahiri's story may be extreme, the lessons it teaches are im-
portant, and not overstated. Most significantly, it illustrates how subjective feel-
ings of mistreatment, when combined with an opportunity for extremist "group-
think," can have a potent hardening effect.77
The current sentencing practice of imposing lengthy sentences, across the
board to all softcore terrorist defendants, exacerbates that risk. Related are the
restrictive conditions of imprisonment that accompany terrorism convictions.
For many convicted terrorists, the conditions of their imprisonment are ex-
tremely restrictive.3 7 These defendants are often assigned to maximum-security
prison facilities and some are subject to a regime of Special Administrative
Measures (SAMs). * As with the length of the sentence, when necessary, SAMs
might be reasonable. But indiscriminate imposition of SAMs, like an unreasona-
bly long sentence, stand to increase the hardening risk. To the extent that the
guideline revisions proposed here imposes more reasonable sentences and less
restrictive conditions where appropriate, and engenders a process for punish-
ment that is perceived as more fair, the law will do more to mitigate these hard-
ening risks than the current system, which exacerbates them.
The United States also has a long-term security interest in winning the hearts
and minds in this conflict. Revising the Sentencing Guidelines as suggested would
375. Id. at 69.
376. Id. at 71.
377. As one Canadian intelligence analyst testified, members of al Qaeda or other related
militant Islamic groups "maintain their ties, and their relationships to those net-
works, for very long periods of time" and that "[t] hese ties are forged in environ-
ments [such as prisons] where relationships mean a great deal, and it is our belief
that the dedication to the ideology, if you will, is very strong, and is virtually im-
possible to break." Rotunda, supra note 368, at 1082.
378. ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 122, at 124 (explaining SAMs); see also Alia Malek,
Gitmo in the Heartland, THE NATION, Mar. 10, 2011, http://www.thenation.com
/article/15916i/gitmo -heartland (explaining the Bureau of Prisons' operation of spe-
cial communications restricted units for terrorist inmates).
379. SAMs are designed to "ensure security for highly dangerous defendants," and "in-
tended to prevent violence within the prison system" and "inmates from sending
communications to others outside of prison." ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 122,
at 124; see 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(a) (2012). At the direction of the Attorney General, the
Bureau of Prisons has developed this regime of SAMs. See id.
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go far in that regard. The proposed revisions are transparent and understanda-
ble.3"o As experts have repeatedly stressed, transparency is key in gaining interna-
tional support for U.S. efforts in the global War on Terror. 8' Also, the normative
framework and model guidelines that lean on it carefully incorporate legal prin-
ciples from both domestic and international law, and consult the historical expe-
riences of the United States as well as the international community. As such, not
only is this sentencing policy transparent, but it also reflects the United States'
appreciation of the global nature of this war and its sense of comity.
This revision of the Sentencing Guidelines would also speak to hearts and
minds at home by bringing U.S. punishment practices closer in line with consti-
tutional standards. Without the Terrorism Enhancement to contend with, the
question of whether its application by a judge under a preponderance of the evi-
dence is unconstitutional disappears. The sentencing analysis required by the
revised guidelines affords ample opportunity to include the jury in finding the
necessary sentencing facts (i.e., the substantial step, the motivation, and the role
and degree of the defendant's participation). With the imposition of a more fact-
intensive sentencing schema, courts will likely begin to require the government
to argue and prove these facts to the jury at trial. Alternatively, if not found dur-
ing the trial by incorporation into the jury charge, it is likely that the parties will
begin to request Fatico hearings before sentencing, at which proceeding the court
will specifically find those facts.383 It is even possible that a new type of Fatico
380. WIT, supra note 5, at 371 ("International standards such as those in the Geneva
Conventions serve to coordinate American actions with those of our allies. Adher-
ence to the laws of armed conflict ... assist[s] American efforts to win over civilian
haearts and minds. The laws of war . .. serve as a useful guide to the nation's long-
term interests.").
381. See John B. Bellinger III, Op. Ed., Will Drone Strikes Become Obama's Guantanamo?,
WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/will
-drone-strikes-become-obamas-guantanamo/2011/o9/30/glQAoRelGLstory.html
(noting the importance of providing information regarding counterterrorism pol-
icies and, with respect to the use of drone strikes in particular, commenting that
"[e]ven if Obama administration officials are satisfied that drone strikes comply
with domestic and international law, they would still be wise to try to build a
broader international consensus"); see also DONOHUE, supra note 61, at 1334-35
(noting that the Diplock courts in England "hurt the United Kingdom's interna-
tional standing," as the accompanying "changes in admissibility of confessions and
rules of evidence raised questions about whether the system was designed to convict
individuals-not to dispense justice").
382. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
383. A Fatico hearing "is designed to allow a judge to determine whether allegations in
a Government sentencing memorandum that are disputed by the defense should
be considered in deciding punishment." Kurt Eichenwald, Sentencing of Milken is
Delayed by Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/199o/o9/28
/business/sentencing-of -milken-is-delayed-by-judge.html.
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hearing might develop for international terrorism cases, in which the jury is in-
cluded and a heightened standard of proof required.384 Such a procedural addi-
tion would be consistent with the military approach, and a step in the right di-
rection toward reorienting the civilian courts' thinking of these cases as part of
an interbranch war strategy.
The proposed framework also alleviates the second constitutional concern
implicated in terrorism prosecutions-the extraterritorial application of U.S. an-
titerrorism laws. To the extent that the revised sentencing guidelines incorporate
established principles from the international law of war, as the framework in-
tends, the resulting guidelines will be more "adjudicative" than "prescriptive." 8 5
Applying them in War on Terror cases would likely not, on that understanding,
imply an attempt to apply U.S. substantive law of sentencing to extraterritorial
conduct. The prospect of a more constitutionally sound sentencing policy thus
has a legitimizing effect, and provides yet another reason why the proposed
framework, and the revised sentencing guideline derived from it, stand to further
the national security interest.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued for an overhaul of the punishment regime applied to
terrorists convicted in Article III courts. It began by examining America's history
and experience with the laws of war, with a special focus on how crime has been
punished in the context of armed conflict. With historical experience in mind,
the Article identified the legal and policy problems with the current system of
sentencing, specifically pointing out the system's failure to appreciate the relevant
principles of international and military law and its underestimation of the im-
portant sentencing goals at stake. The Article argued for a more appropriate and
effective framework for sentencing, comprised of the principles of proportional-
ity and necessity, with reference to aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
That framework would be animated by the sentencing purposes of incapacitation
and deterrence, and would afford courts an opportunity to consider the rehabil-
itative purposes of their sentences as well.
384. Although largely beyond the scope of this Article, it bears mention that the inclu-
sion of the jury at the sentencing stage of trial is consistent with the historic role of
the jury and the Framers' understanding of the role and responsibilities of the jury.
See, e.g., Jenia lontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311,
316-17 (2003).
385. See Oona Hathaway, Online Kiobel Symposium: TheATS Is in Good Company, SCO-
TUSBLOG (July 17, 2012, 11:37 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012
/07/online-kiobel-symposium-the-ats-is-in-good-company (making this argu-
ment in connection with a defense of the Alien Tort Statute); Oona Hathaway, Re-
sponse: International Law Supplies the Conduct Rules and Domestic Law Governs En-
forcement, SCOTUSBLOG (July 20, 2012, 12:49 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com
/2012/07/response- international-law- supplies-the- conduct- rules -and- domestic
-law- governs -enforcement (same).
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From those normative principles, the Article proposed a way to revise the
Sentencing Guidelines and replace the Terrorism Enhancement. It explained why
it is in the United States' interest to undertake such a project. For one, the United
States has the opportunity to develop, for the first time, standards for punishing
terrorists that are consistent with the laws and customs of war. Developing more
robust sentencing guidelines for the War on Terror would, therefore, reflect
America's traditional role at the forefront of advancing the laws and customs of
war and serve as a testament to its continued global leadership in this regard.
Ultimately, U.S. efforts to develop a new body of sentencing law, which considers
the international law of war together with the domestic criminal law, would
demonstrate the United States' commitment to waging an effective, yet transpar-
ent and legitimate, War on Terror.
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